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CHAPl'ER 1

In recent years insider trading has received considerable attention.
Insiders are persons who possess information about a firm which is not
available to the general public.

This information is typically acquired as a

by-product of activities performed by the insider for his corporate employer.
The majority of insiders occupy top positions in the corporate hierarchy,
though large stockholders and others may also have access to such knowledge.
The costs incurred by the insider to produce or procure this information are
negligible; however, once in his possession, this information is potentially
valuable.

This value arises from an insider's ability to profitably

speculate in his corporation's stock or other securities.

Based upon his

special nonpublic knowledge, an insider can purchase securities prior to an
impending rise in price or sell prior to an impending decline.

The recent

attention devoted to insider trading has been due to widespread concern
regarding the consequences this practice may have on individuals,
corporations, and the functioning of securities markets.
Prior to the stock market collapse of 1929, insider trading was conm::>nly
practiced and generally aa:::epted throughout the stock market.

However, with

the onslaught of the Great Depression, public sentiment changed dramatically.
Insider trading became widely perceived as an ethically reprehensible practice
in which unscrupulous businessmen attempt to profit at the expense of their
corporations' shareholders.

Indeed, during the Congressional hearings of

1933-1934, insider trading was labeled a major factor contributing to the ,
economic collapse. (1) Furtherl1Ore, since no countervailing benefits were
associated with the practice, its regulation was seen as readily justifiable.
Consequently, to prOl1Ote the notion of fairness in the marketplace for
1-1
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securities, regulations of insider trading were introduced under Section 16 of
the 1934 Securities Exchange Act.
The Securities Exchange Act was designed to regulate the trading of
securities on organized exchanges.

Section 16(a) of the Act formally defines

insiders as corporate officers, directors, or owners of ten percent or more of
a corporation's stock.

FUrthermore, it requires that these insiders register

all transactions involving their corporation's securities with the Securities
and Exchange CcxTmission (SOC).

Section 16 (b), known as the 'short swing'

rule, outlaws any coatJined purchase and sale (or sale and purchase) occuring
within a six month period.

Liability under this law is determined

mechanically; that is, whether an insider is guilty of a 16(b) violation is
determined irrespective of how much evidence is adduced of unfair resort to
nonpublic knowledge.

Finally, Section 16(c) prohibits an insider from selling

short his corporation's stock.
In 1942 the SEC created what is now considered the cornerstone of federal
insider trading laws:

RIle lOb-So

This statute makes it illegal for a person

to make false or misleading statements or to neglect to state a mater ial fact

in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.

RIle 10b-S is

sometimes referred to as the 'disclose or abstain' rule since it requires that
when making a security transaction, a person must truthfully disclose all
material information upon which his trade is based or abstain from trading.
Until the 1960's insider trading was widely perceived as an unfair and
~mful

practice for which regulation was necessary and justified.

This

opinion emphasizing its undesirability came to be known as the traditional
view.

In 1966 Henry Manne [31J published his book Insider Trading and the

Stock Market which challenged the traditional way of thinking by asserting
that the case against insider trading was overstated.

FUrthernore, he
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enphasized potential benefits from insider trading, thereby questioning the
justification for the regulations.

Though Manne's arguments were largely

discounted by traditional thinkers, his book sparked a controversy over the
desirability of regulations governing insider trading.
On one side of this controversy are the traditionalists, who argue that

insider trading i s harmful for several reasons.

First, it injures individuals

because it causes a redistribution of wealth from outside investors to
insiders.

Second, they claim that this practice harms corporations by

providing an incentive for managers to make poor decisions.

AOO third, it is

argued that insider trading leads to an allocationally and informationally
less less efficient securities market.

For the.s e reasons proponents of the

traditional view fervently support regulations of insider trading.
Critics of the traditional view first assert that the harm to individuals
from insider trading is overstated, and that, in fact, insider trading is
beneficial to firms because it serves as a unique form of remuneration for
innovative activity within the corporation.

Second, it is argued that this

practice provides incentives for the rapid dissemination of information
thereby contributing to accurate pricing of securities.

AOO finally, ir£ider

trading is said to prevent the misallocation of resources toward the socially
wasteful production of information.

Although this debate between the

traditionalists and their critics remains unresolved, regulatory policy toward
insider trading has always favored the former viewpoint.
Since 1978 the

SEX::

has been engaged in an ongoing crackdown against

insider trading which has resulted in the filing of charges in more cases than
in the previous 44 years of its governance over insiders. (2) Nevertheless, the
effectiveness of these actions in thwarting illegal behavior is
questionable. (3) As one highly placed

SEX::

official has stated, "The greed of
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people in high places, as well as average people, presents an insurmountable
obstacle ... (4) Not only are trading violations difficult to detect, but even
when suspects are apprehended, convictions are nearly inpossible to obtain.
In fact, since 1934, only six people have ever been convicted on criminal
charges of violating insider trading proscriptions, and one conviction was
later overturned. (5) Trading on inside information has been described by one
Congressman as "a ganbl.e many are willirg to take, since criminal sanctions
are rarly sought by the Justice Department. n (6) Amid mountirg criticism of its
history of lenient settlements, the SEC has renewed efforts to expand its
current enforcement powers against insiders.
The purpose of this study is to examine the effectiveness of current
regulations of insider trading.

In the past, examinations of regulatory

effectiveness have been solely concerned with analyses of the . excess returns
earned by insiders from their trading actiovities in the stock market.
~tudy,

however, involves a JOOre direct approach to the problem.

that for regulations to be

effect~ve,

This

It is assumed

two conditions must be satisfied.

First, they must be stated in a manner which prohibits all types of behavior
which would be considered harmful.

Second, the regulations must be enforced

to the point where the marginal enforcement costs are no greater than the
marginal loss from JOOre insider trading.

It is the thesis of this paper that

current regulations of insider trading are neither accurately stated nor
adeguately enforced thereby enabling insiders to reap excess returns from
their tradirg activities in the stock and options markets.
The study will be structured as follows.

Olapter 2 presents the

traditional view of insider tradirg alorg with several alternative theories.
Olapter 3 presents an in-depth examination of the intentions of insider
trading regulations as well as the methods and difficulties associated with
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their enforcement.

Chapter 4 describes past empirical studies and discusses

their implications regarding regulatory effectiveness.

In

Chapter 5 the

regulations of insider trading are shown to contain loopholes which allow
insiders to follow trading strategies which are faithful to the language but
not the intent of these proscriptions.

In ClIapter 6 a Irethodology is

presented for testing regulatory effectiveness, and the results of this test
are presented in Chapter 7.

Finally, Chapter 8 discusses policy implications

and contains concluding remarks.
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(1)

W. Ripley, Main Street and Wall Street (Cantlridge: Harvard
University Press, 1926), cited by Mackay and Reid [28J,
p. 108.

(2)

"Wall Street Ib.lbts the SOC Will CUrtail Insider Trading,"
(51] •

(3)

See Bleiberg (4) ; Blustein (5); Crock [7]; Louis [27] .

(4)

Louis [27J, p. 72.

(5)

Kosterlitz [24J, p. 21.

(6)

Marcial [31J, p. 82.

The effects of the security transactions of corporate insiders on traders
who

do not have access

to

nonpublic information regarding the corporation, and

on the functioning of securities markets in general has been the subject of a
long, acrim:mious and, as yet, unresolved debate.

The nature of this

controversy, in its sinplest form, centers around the question, "Are the
existing regulations of insider trading justified?" Respondents to this
question have endorsed one of t-lolO opposing schools of thought.
more widely held theory, referred
insider trading is harmful

to

The older and

as the traditional view, proposes that

to

both individual traders and the normal operation

of securities markets, and should, therefore, be regulated.

In opposition

to

the traditional view, several alternative theories have been proposed
emphasizing the potential benefits from insider trading.

These criticisms

assert that current regulations of insider trading cannot be justified without
giving consideration to the countervailing benefits from this practice.
far, the critics have been unable

to

Thus

produce any relevant empirical studies

supporting their assertions, and, despite the fact that current regulatory
policies and enforcement activities firmly embrace traditional ways of
thinking, the controversy remains unresolved.

To facilitate a detailed

development of these two opposing views, it is first necessary

to

make several

asswnptions.
It is assumed that securities markets are composed of two distinct types
of traders:

insiders and outsiders.

characteristics.

Insiders are distinguished by two

First, they are able to obtain information regarding the

future profitability of their corporation no later than outsiders.
2-1

Insiders
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are privy to this information by virtue of their relationship with their
=rporation (e.g., officer, director, or large shareholder).

Because insiders

always obtain their information no later than outsiders, and because they
usually have the power to determine when this information is disclosed to the
public, they are relatively accurate predicbors of future price movements.
Specifically, insiders possess the ability to predict when, in what direction,

and, to some extent, the magnitude of future price changes in their
corporation's stock.

This fact gives the insider a substantial trading

advantage in securities markets.
The second distinguishing characteristic of insiders is that they are able

to acquire information at a marginal cost of zero. (1) In other words, their

information is acquired in the course of making decisions or performing duties
for their =rporate enployer.

In contrast, this information is relatively

=stly for outsiders to obtain prior to its release.
The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to describing in greater
detail the nature of the debate between the traditionalists and their critics.
Several arguments favoring the former viewpoint shall be presented, followed
by several alternative theories.

The earliest of all traditional arguments cOncerns the notion of fairness.
The practice of insider trading has been considered 'unfair' because insiders
are able to base their trading decisions on information which is not available
to outsiders.

The unfairness ar ises not only because insiders acquire their

information before outsiders, but also because there exists no lawful means by
which the outsider may remove the insider's informational advantage. (2)
It was this overriding concern for fairness which provided the inpetus for
the regulation of insider trading and of security markets in general.

Indeed,

the purpose of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, as stated in its prean'ble,
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was "[t]o provide for the regulation of securities exchanges ••• to prevent
inequitable and unfair practices on such exchanges •••• "(3)
Although the perception that insider trading is unfair involves no
economic considerations, it remains a popular justification for the regulation
of this practice. (4)

Schotland [411 does not underestimate the iJrportance of

equity considerations when he states:
Even if we found that unfettered insider trading would bring an economic
gain, we might still forego that gain in order to secure a stock market
and intracorporate relationships that satisfy such noneconomic goals as
fairness, just rewards and integrity.(S)
Even though insider trading may offend our basic notions of fairness, such
normative judgements carry little weight in economic circles.

Arguing from

an

economic standpoint, traditionalists contend that insider trading is unfair
because it represents the risk of direct harm to outsiders.
occurs when an outsider trades directly with an insider.

Direct injury

For instance, if an

outsider purchases shares fram an insider who is selling based on negative,
nonpublic information, then injury occurs when that information is disclosed
and

the outsider's shares decline in price.

Similarly,

when

an outsider sells

his shares to an inSider, he foregos the gain associated with the eventual
rise in price.

Assuming that insiders' trades are always profitable, then

allowing insiders to trade freely inplies a direct redistribution of wealth
from the uninformed outsiders

to

the insiders.

In other words, the gains

accruing to insiders equal the losses incurred by outsiders.
The traditionalists present further testimony against insider trading by
extending their argument that this practice leaves outsiders at an unfair
disadvantage.

It is asserted that when insiders are permitted

to

trade

freely, outsiders realize they are at a disadvantage and consequently lose
confidence in the stock market.

Schotland contends that the exploitation of
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valuable information by insiders
will tend to discourage outsiders' participation in the stock market,
which in turn will tend to reduce the health of that market and have a
negative inpact on corporations already held publicly, on smaller
corporations which may need rore capital to grow and on the economy as a
whole. (6)
Recall that insiders, by definition, are the managers of corporations, and
that outsiders, by virtue of their stockholdings, can be considered owners of
corporations.

Hence, in this light, the loss of confidence by outsiders can

be viewed as a consequence of the conflict of interest between the managers
and owners of a firm.

greater detail.

The rationale for this conflict can be stated in

First, managers have the incentive to speculate in their

corporation's stock based on information they acquire as a by-product of their
corporate functions.

EUrtherrore, gains accruing to managers as a result of

their trading activity will be at the expense of (actual or potential)
shareholders.

Hence, a conflict arises because the incentive exists for

managers to violate their fiduciary duty to the owners of the firm.

A

fiduciary duty requires that managers atteIlpt to act in the best interests of
shareholders. (7)
Since it is in the firm's best interest to prevent practices which would
have a negative impact-on the welfare of shareholders, possible support for
this theory may be manifested in attenpts by firms to limit the trading
activity of their corporate officers.

Indeed, Avon Products and Union Carbide

have both imposed trading restrictions on their managers which are rore severe
than the current regulations(S)

The indirect or social harm caused by insider trading can be presented in
rore concrete terms by considering risks and returns.

Consider two firms X

and Y which are alike in all respects except that insider trading occurs in

security X but not in security Y.

As a consequence, outsiders who trade
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security X have a positive probability of trading with an insider and thus run
a greater risk of incurring a loss or forgoing a gain than those outsiders who
trade security Y.

Begin by assuming that the public is aware of the

distinction between the two companies.

This implies that each outsider will

either avoid trading security X or will demand that it pay a higher return
than security Y. (9) A recent incident involving possibly illegal insider
trading activity in the shares of Warner CoJll1llnications Inc. may serve to
illustrate this point. (10)
Beginning early in the fall of 1982, warner stock began soaring amid
widespread enthusiasm over the prospects for its highly profitable Atari
division.

Meanwhile, however, nine warner insiders were busy selling more

than $7.7 million worth of warner OO!I1IOn shares.

Then, in early DeceITber, the

entertainment c:onpany released a lower-than-expected fourth-quarter earnings
projection which triggered a massive selling spree.

Within several days after

the announcement, Warner stock had plunged nearly 50 percent.

Several weeks

later Warner publicly revealed that several insiders had sold shares prior to
the announcement.

It is apparent that this development has led same pecple to

avoid trading shares of Warner stock.

One analyst was quoted as saying, "I

will never again trust the peq>le who now run warner, " while another advised
investors to "stay away from the stock. n (11)
Once again consider the two companies X and Y; however, now

~

that

outsiders are unable to distinguish any difference between the two concerns.
That is, the public is rot aware that insider trading occurs in security X but
rot in security Y.

According to Srudney [6J,

A rational buyer (or seller) in a market, who knows the person with whom
he is dealing has mater ial information about the value of the product
being exchanged which he could rot lawfully acquire, will either refrain
from dealing with that transactor or demand a risk premium. If the market
is thought to be systematically populated with such transactors sc:rne
investors will refrain from dealing altogether, and others will incur
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costs to avoid dealing with such transactors or corruptly to overcome
their unerodable informational advantages. None of these responses is
socially useful. (12)
In other words, outsiders are now apprehensive about trading the shares of
either security X or Y.

Although it is known that less insider trading goes

on in one of the companies, outsiders are not sure which company that is.
Hence, it must be assumed that both securities present an equal and positive
risk of wealth losses due to insider trading. (13) Investors will now command a
higher return from both securities and consequently the market will became
less allocationally efficient.

Allocational efficiency refers to the ability

of a market to ,a llocate resources to their highest valued use.

In this case,

insider trading leads to reduced allocational efficiency because both Ccrtpany
X and Carpany Y must pay a higher return thereby raising the cost of equity
financing to these two firms. (14) Thus, the traditionalists argue, it is
necessary to regulate insider trading in order to maintain allocational
efficiency in securities markets.
Tb provide further support for their viewpoint, traditionalists examine
the effects of insider trading on. informational efficiency.

Informational

efficiency refers to the speed with which information is incorporated in
security ' prices.

A market is less informationally efficient the longer it

takes for information to be reflected in prices.

It is argued that in a

market in which insiders are permitted to trade freely the disclosure of
information is unnecessarily delayed. (15) Insiders cannot realize the gains
from their trades until their information is released causing pr ices to
adjust.

However, insiders have the incentive to delay the disclosure thereby

allowing themselves to execute trades ' at pr ices which do not reflect all known
information.

UJring the period of time between the discovery of information

and its eventual release, securities are mispriced: i.e., the actual returns
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deyiate from the returns that would be paid if all information were publicly
ayailable.

Consequently, capital reso..trces are terrporarily misallocated. (16)

'Ibe traditionalists reason that if insider trading were regulated, then
insiders could no longer profit from their special information, and thus, they
Io'OUld haye no incentiYe to delay the release of that information.
Finally, insider trading is perceiYed as harmful because it prOYides an
incentiYe for managers to deliberately make poor decisions. (17) 'Ibe ability to
sell stock short, buy put options, and write call options giYes security
traders the opportunity to profit from declines in a stock's price.

Since

oonlDan stock represents shares of ownership in a corporation, changes in a
stock's price represent changes in the market's assessment of the
corresponding firm's profitability.

Furthermore, since the decisions made by

insiders directly affect their firms' future profitability, they can be said
to haye some degree of control oyer thE! price of their conpany's stock.

Consequently, the incentiYe exists for an insider to breach his fiduciary duty
by deliberately making poor decisions and profiting from the subsequent price

decline in his corporation's stock.

Cbliously, a similar incentiYe exists for

making good decisions; howeYer, traditionalists argue that allowing insiders
to profit from both positiYe and negatiYe information will, at least, lead
managers ' to choose riskier yentures.

'Ibis is because there is a direct

relationship between the yariability of a project's outcome and the value of
information relating to that outcome. (18) By regulating the trading actiYity
of insiders, the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders can be
eliminated.
'!be traditionalists make five primary arguments against insider trading.

First, they claim that insider trading is sinply unfair because insiders haye
a distinct trading adYantage oyer outsiders due to their possession of
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material, nonpublic information.

Second, the assertion is made that insider

trading is harmful because it directly injures those outsiders with whom the
insiders trade.

That is, sirx:e insiders' gains equal outsiders' losses,

insider trading causes a redistribution of wealth from outsiders to insiders.
Third, it is argued that, in addition to the direct harm, there exists an
indirect harm fram insider trading which is manifested in an allocationally
less efficient stock market.

Specifically, because outsiders always run the

risk of direct injury from trading with insiders, they tend to lose confiderx:e
in the market.

Consequently, outsiders either avoid trading altogether or

demand a risk premium.

This, in turn leads to allocational inefficiency by

making equity funding nore expensive for all fiI1l5.

Fourth, it is argued that

insider trading unnecessarily delays the dissemination of information to the
marketplace for securities.

This also leads to allocational inefficiency by

causing securities to become mispriced.

Fifth, the traditionalists argue that

insider trading provides .an incentive for managers to violate their fiduciary
duty by deliberately making poor decisions.
Originally, justification for the regulation of insider trading was based
solely upon the traditionalists' first argument that this practice is unfair
to outsiders.

Because no countervailing benefits were believed to exist,

regulation of insider trading was thought to be beneficial.

In recent years,

however, a small but vocal group of critics bringing economic reasoning to
bear on the subject have challenged this traditional viewpoint.

According to

these critics, current justification for the regulation of insider trading is
based on prima facie eviderx:e which fails to pay consideration to the

potential benefits from the practice.

In response to the contrary theories,

traditionalists were pressed to strengthen their case against insider trading.
Thus, the remainder of the traditional arguments arose in response to the
critics' assertions.
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The first person to question the traditional justification for the
regulation of insider trading was Henry G. Manne [31] in his book Insider
Trading and the Stock Market published in 1966.

In this pioneering work,

Manne presents several arguments which he claims provide support for an
alternative view that the harm fram insider trading is overstated, and,
fur thernnre , that insider trading is, in fact, beneficial to the
of a capitalist scx:iety.

fu~ticning

The issues raised in this book, along with the

extensive comnent they provoked, provided a foundation for the controversy
surrounding the desirability of insider trading which, to this day, remains
unresolved.

The argument that the perceived harm from insider trading is

overstated will be presented first.
The . traditional view asserts that insider trading prevents outsiders fram
realizing gains they otherwise would have had.

Manne contends, however, that

the gains received by insiders as a result of their trading activity cannot be
construed as a 'loss' to outsiders.
corporation's stock in
esse~e,

adv~e

When insiders purchase shares of their

of an inpending

i~rease

in price, they are, in

exchanging the value of their publicly unknown information for an

appreciation in the value of their shares.
the price of all shares rises.

As insiders make their purchases,

Since the insiders do not own all outstanding

shares of their corporation's stock, they cannot possibly capture the full
value of their information when it is made public.

Thus, outside shareholders

who may have no knowledge of this information will also benefit from the rise
in price.

Essentially, the insiders have allowed outside shareholders to

benefit from their information at no cost.
been created.

This cx:curs because new value has

The insiders' gain is part of this newly created value, and

this gain is not made at anyone's expense.

Thus, since some outsiders have

gained, all outsiders taken as a group do not necessarily lose as a result of
insider trading.
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Manne extends t his conclusion by presenting an ex ante argument that those
outsiders who do trade directly with insiders are not necessarily harmed.
facilitate his argument Manne divides all securities traders
insiders) into two groups:

To

(excluding

time function traders and price function traders.

Time function traders can be thought of as long term holders or 'investors;'
i.e., people whose decisions to buy or sell are based upon events unrelated to
short term changes in price.

For exarrple, persons who buy or sell because

their long term investment needs have changed, or because they feel the
investment climate has been altered due to some national or international
event would be considered time function traders.

Price function traders can

be thought of as speculators, chartists, or persons engaging in arbitrage;
i.e., persons whose trading decisions are a function of short term price
fluctuations.

Although differel"lCes between the two groups are not always

clearcut, Manne's reasons for making the distinction will soon become clear.
Manne's argument rests upon the implicit assumption that a lag exists
between the time when information is first produced and the time when that
information is publicly disseminated.

If insider trading does not occur, then

a full and rapid price adjustment will take place on the date of disclosure.
On

the other hand, if insiders are permitted to trade freely on the basis of

their (positive) information, then they will gradually bid up a stock's price
prior to the release date.

To determine the extent of the injury to outsiders

due to insider trading, Manne conpares the am:lUnt that outsiders gain by
trading on positive information during the gradual price rise to the amount
they would have had with the delayed but sharp price rise associated with

00

insider trading.
When insider trading is permitted and a stock's price is gradually bid up
by the insiders' purchases, both time and price function traders will be
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buying and selling shares in the market.

Manne argues that time function

traders, whether buying or selling, WQJld have done so regardless of the
gradual upswing in price and, therefore, cannot be construed as losers.

That

is, even if insider trading were not occur ing (and the stock I s price was
therefore stable prior to announcement), then these investors still WQJld have
made their trades.

(This is the reason for Manne I s distinction between time

and price function traders.) Specifically, when a time function trader
purchases stock as the price is being bid up by insiders, ' he benefits because
he shares in the appreciation in value received by insiders.

On the other

hand, the time function trader who sells stock during the price rise is also
better off.

This is because his selling price is higher than that which would

have pervailed if insiders were prevented from trading .

In neither case can

the time function traders be said to lose since their trading decisions are

made independently of the price changes caused by insiders.
Price function traders, however, are potential losers since their trades
are induced by the price fluctuations attributed to insider trading.

If

insiders were not permitted in the market, then the price would remain stable
(prior to the dissemination date), and the speculators WQJld probably not be
trading.

Specifically, price function traders lose ' if they sell to an insider

since the price they receive is lower (in the case of positive information)
than if they had not based their purchasing decision on price rrovements;

however, they gain if they happen to purchase at the same time as insiders.
Hence, when positive information is considered, allowing insiders to trade
freely will have the following results.

Positive gains accrue only to time

function traders when they sell to insiders, while both time and price
function traders will gain if they happen to buy at the same time as insiders.
Negatively, any price function trader will lose if he sells when insiders are
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buying.

FurtherIlOre, any price function trader who would have purchased stock

if there had been a rule preventing insider trading will also miss out on the
price rise.
In the case of positive information, the outsider is IIOre likely to
benefit the less frequently shares are sold.

In other words, the gains from

allowing insider trading tend to accrue to time function traders while price
function traders tend to lose.

By limiting the discussion to long term

investors rather than the short term speculators, Manne asserts that there is
little likelihood for injury from insider trading.

Recalling that time

function traders benefit by selling to insiders as prices are bid up, Manne
argues that these investors will benefit to a greater extent if the
information is incorporated in price IIOre expediticnsly.

He states that the

traditional argument that insider trading is harmful to outsiders as a group
is valid only if "price changes occur IIOre gradually with insider trading than
without it."(19) If the alternative to insider trading were full and immediate
disclosure of all information, then, Manne argues, prices would adjust IIOre
slowly under insider trading, thus injuring time function traders.

However,

because full and immediate disclosure is not, and probably cannot be enforced,
Manne concludes that the purported harm to outsiders from allowing insiders to
trade freely is overstated.
To lend further support to the critics' case, Manne proposes that insider

trading is beneficial because it provides a necessary form of remuneration for
"entrepreneurs." (20) Here, an enterpreneur is defined as being an ' innovator
within the corporate organization.

For various reascns Manne deduces that

salaries, bonuses, and stock options provide inadequate incentives for the
development of new methods of utilizing the factors of production.

Given the

limitations of these methods of payment, he then argues that allowing the
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entrepreneur to trade on his inside knowledge would enable him to compensate
himself with a reward which accuratlely reflects the worth of his innovations.
Insider trading meets all the ccnditions for appropriately conpensating
entrepreneurs. It readily allows corporate entrepreneurs to market their
innovations •••• [Tlhis is not a direct marketing of the idea but rather a
"sale" of information abalt an innovati<XI. Thus, although we do not allow
entrepreneurs a direct proprietary interest in their ideas, we can allow
recovery for their ideas by permitting them to exploit information about
the existence of the ideas in a market primarily based on informati<XI. (21)
Furthermore, it has been pointed out that insiders' ability to profit from
bad news will not necessarily lead them to violate their fiduciary duty.
Managers who produce negative information abalt their firm by deliberately
making poor decisions will concurrently reduce the value of their human
capital.

Thus, the labor market serves to restrain management from

deliberately making unsound decisions and profiting from the resulting
negative information. (22)
In his 1969 article, "Perfect Competition, Regulation, and the Stcck
Market," Harold Demsetz (8] proposes that insider trading contributes to
greater efficiency in the stock market.

Demsetz's primary concern is with

achieving and maintaining efficient markets.

He rejects the predisposition

that imperfections are necessarily undesirable by recognizing that there is a
cost associated with their rellOVal.

Demsetz states, "Conplete absense of

imperfections is consistent with efficiency only if the cost of accomplishing
this objective is zero." (23) Thus, if instituting regulations is the means by
which ill¥?E!rfections are to be reduced, it is essential that some consideration
be given to the likely costs and benefits involved.

In particular, Demsetz

examines the imperfection known as insider trading.
Demsetz delineates the problem of insider trading into two separate
issues.

First there is the question of whether it is desirable for firms to

enploy secrecy in an attenpt to increase their profits.

This he calls the
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"corporate use of secrecy." The second issue is raised by managerrent' s ability
to realize personal gain from the information they obtain as a by-product of

their corporate activities.
To determine whether regulation of insider trading is justified, Demsetz

first examines the desirability of the corporate use of secrecy.

He asserts

that corporate secrecy plays a necessary role in the incentive system, and
thus its use should not be discouraged.

Further!lOre, since achieving a

reduction in the use of secrecy through regulation is such

a large scale

task, the costs involved would likely preclude any significant benefits.
Demsetz observes that "there is little the SEC can do to eliminate collpletely
the profits associated with the possession of valuable market knowledge." (24)
Instead, he argues, the IroSt the SEC could hope to achieve is raising the cost
to insiders of utilizing the !lOst obvious forms of insider trading (i.e., an
insider trading his corporation's securities in his name).
If the SEC does opt to regulate insider trading, Demsetz argues that

valuable information will be made public with greater delay while insiders
pursue less obvious, time consuming trading strategies (e.g., trading through
'agents' or in the securities of corporations marketing substitute or
canplementary goods).

In other words, regulation of insider trading reduces

insiders' incentives to release information quickly.

The result is a delay in

the adjustment of security prices to the level at which those prices reflect
all known information.

Permitting insiders to ellploy the IroSt direct methods

of realizing a return from their information will tend to reduce the time
period required for the inpounding of all informatioo in prices.

Hence,

conpared to a market in which insider trading is regulated, a noo-regulated
market will be !lOre efficient in both an informatiooal and allocative sense.
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Several of the arguments presented thus far, favoring both the traditional
and

alternative viewpoints, suffer from shortcomings.

First, the

traditionalists fail to recognize that incentives exist for insiders to
produce and

pr~tly

disseminate their informatic.n.

An

insider basing his

security trades on nonpublic knowledge cannot realize a return from his
information until it is publicly disclosed thereby causing share prices to
adjust to their new equilibrium level.

Consequently, when insiders are

permitted to trade, the incentive exists for informati()n to be produced.
Furthermore, insiders have an incentive to disclose informatic.n promptly
follcMing its production.

Olring the period after an insider takes his

security position but prior to his release of the relevant information, the
value of his portfolio is subject to adverse price effects originating from
other · sources.

The insider can reduce this investment risk by disseminating

his information and closing out his security position as soon after making his
initial trade as possible.

Thus, risk averse insiders have the incentive to

promptly disclose information which they acquire.
A second shortcoming suffered by traditional and alternative arguments
alike is their failure to adequately address the subject of informational
efficiency in security markets.

In particular, these arguments do not explain

why informational efficiency is desirable, nor do they pr()po5e a method for
measuring the costs associated with a reduction in informational efficiency.
At first blush, one is tempted to argue that informational efficiency is
desirable because it leads to accurate pricing of securities thus ensuring
that resources will be allocated to.rard their highest valued use.
assertion, though technically correct, is

too

This

vague to be of any use.

Specifically, it fails to recognize that a lack of complete information
regarding a security implies consequences unlike those resulting from
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incomplete information in other markets.

These differences arise due to

dissimilarities between sellers of securities and sellers of other goods.
Taking the latter case first, CXlI1sider a market for used cars. (25)
In a used car market, sellers typically know the quality or value of the
automobiles they are attempting to sell, while buyers are not privy to this
knowledge.

Hence, an asymetry in available information develops.

As a

consequence, those traders possessing IIDre information, i.e., the sellers,
will avoid transactions at pr ices which fail to meet or exceed a car's true
value.

That is, no used cars will be sold at prices which understate their

value based on all known information.
Now

consider a securities market in which those persons poSsessing inside

information do not trade.

In this case, if information regarding securities

is known, but not publicly available, then it will not influence anyone's
trading decisions.
sellers.

Thus, no asymetry in information exists between buyers and

Nevertheless, since security prices fail to reflect all known

information, trades occur at prices which do not reflect true value.
FurtherllDre, since this information could be either positive or negative, some
securities are underpriced while others are overpriced by the market.

That

is, same securities will yield returns that are too high while others will
yield returns that are too low.

Unlike prices in the used car market,

security prices may be biased in both directions.

Thus, it is not readily

apparent that an informationally inefficient securities market is absolutely
undesirable--some traders win, albeit inadvertently, while others lose.
To determine whether incentives to acquire and disseminate information

contribute to efficient resource allocation, it is IIDre useful to examine the
nature of the information involved rather than the mispr icing that results in
its absense. (26) A distinction will be made based upon whether the information

2-17
affects production.

Information which is useful in making production

decisions is referred to as operational information.

In general, c:perational

information pertains to the recognition of something that already exists but
IIKlUld never be known if the information were not produced.

(An

exanple of

c:perational information is the development of some new technology that could
be applied to a variety of manufacturing processes.) The second type of
information is called trading information and pertains to knowledge about
events that IIKlUld occur regardless of whether information were produced about
them.

(An

exanple of trading information is knowledge of a firm's accounting

figures.) The cr itical distinction between t.'1ese types of information is that
c:perational information is valuable to firms since it enables them to make
cperating decisions at least as good as those they could make in its absence.
Trading information, however, is valueless to firms since it relates to
decisions already made.

It is now necessary to examine the costs and

benefits, both individual and scx::ial, asscx::iated with the production and
dissemination of these two types of information.
Prior knowledge of trading or operational information about a firm is
privately valuable (i.e., valuable to an individual).

This private value

arises from the ability of an informed investor to trade the ownership shares
of firms about which he possesses nonpublic information; that is, he can trade
shares at prices which fail to reflect their true value.

Thus, each

individual has an incentive to generate information until its marginal benefit
(to

him) equals its marginal cost.

Furthermore, an informed individual also

has an incentive to publicize his information, althOugh not before .he has made
a

specu~tive

ccmni.tment.

The crucial question now becomes, how does scx::iety

benefit from the private production and dissemination of information?
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First, consider trading information.

Since this information has equal

likelihood of being positive or negative, the expected change in the

~arket

value of a firm's shares associated with positive expenditures on trading
information is always zero.

Therefore, the expected effect of disclosing such

information is nothing more than a redistribution of wealth among investors.
If the production of this information uses up real resources, then a situation
has arisen which is not consistent with Pareto optimality.

That is, there

exist obtainable distributions of wealth which would make sane investors
better off, while leaving none worse off.

Pareto superior distributions could

be reached if individuals refrained from allocating resources toward the
generation of socially valueless trading information.

Tb illustrate this

point, suppose that rather than allowing for private generation of trading
information, the entire community of investors could be simultaneously
informed about sane bit of trading information.

The question is how much

would they pay as a group to receive this information?

Since this information

will have no inpact on the operation of firms, and will only serve to
redistribute wealth aIOOI'lg investors, the answer is:

nothing.

Now consider the social implications of the private production of
operational information.

Here, the individual's incentive to disclose his

information is now socially desirable since firms can utilize the information
to improve their productive processes.

That is, using the earlier

illustration, the community would pay a positive amount to have the
information disclosed simultaneously to all investors.

Nevertheless, if costs

are incurred in the production or dissemination of q;>erational information,
the net benefits to society are not clearcut.
Tb sum, both trading and operational information are privately valuable,
and thus, incentives exist for their production and dissemination.

Trading
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information, however, has no social value since it does not contr iOOte to
produCtion decisions.

FUrthermore, if resources are expended to generate this

knowledge, then there is a loss to society.

~rational

information, on the

other hand, is socially valuable; however, the gain from public disclosure
rust be offset by any costs associated with the acquisition or dissemination
process.

These arguments illply that insider trading is, at best, a socially

useless practice when trading information is involved.

\'/hen operational

information is considered, insider trading will be socially desirable only if
the~production

value of the information exceeds the costs associated with its

generaton and disclosure.

This analysis suggests that the proper approach to

determining whether insider trading should be regulated is to examine costs
rather than benefits.

That is, are the costs to society less when insiders

are permitted to trade freely or when their trading practices are regulated?
Building upon the previous arguments, r-bran [36] examines the social costs
when insider trading is regulated versus those when insider trading is
unregulated.

Considering the former case, it is assumed that the regulations

remove the private value of information to insiders by preventing trading
practices which would yield above average returns.

Consequently, insiders no

longer have an incentive to trade based upon their special knowledge.
FUrthermore, their incentive to disclose information soon after its
acquisition is also removed.

(Recall that when insiders are permitted to

trade freely, they have an incentive to reduce their investment risk by
minimizing the time period they withhold information.) Since information now
becanes public more slowly, securities are often mispriced by the market.
Outsiders, realizing that publicly unknown information exists, have an
incentive to produce or acquire this knowledge since it is privately valuable
to them.

Expenditures toward generating this information contribute nothing
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to output and thus represent social waste.

Hence, the regulation of insider

trading leads to expenditures of real resources toward generating information
which contributes nothing to output.
Alternatively, consider the consequences when insider trading is
unregulated.

Here, contrary to the former case, information is privately

valuable to insiders as well as outsiders.

Since insiders are permitted to

trade based upon their special knowledge, they have an incentive to produce
information, establish speculative positions, and then publicly disclose their
information.

In order to reduce their investment risk, insiders shorten the

period they withhold information; thus, securities are mispriced less
frequently than when insider trading is regulated.

Since insiders are capable

of obtaining information before outsiders, they are able to "capture the
change in market value asociated with any new inEtrmation regardless of the
information produced by outsiders." (27) Consequently, outsiders no longer have
the incentive to expend capital on the production of information which will
not enable them to capture trading profits.

Although insiders still have

private incentives to acquire information, this acquisition is accomplished
sinply through performing their corporate duties and thus, the costs involved
are negligible.

Consequently, since insiders can generate and disseminate

information nore quickly and at a lower cost than outsiders, "hran concludes
that there is less social waste associated with allowing insider trading than
with regUlating the practice.
Critics of the traditional view offer three primary arguments emphasizing
the benefits fran insider trading.

The first is that allowing insiders to

trade freely provides a unique form of remmeration for corporate
entrepreneurs thereby strengthening incentives for innovative activity within
the firm.

The secq'ld argument is that when insiders are permitted to base
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trading decisions on their special knowledge, they have an incentive to
rapidly disseminate this information.

Consequently, market prices adjust more

quickly when insiders trade than if they are forced to pursue more time
consuming trading strategies or to abstain from trading all together.

'!he

third argument is that insider trading reduces incentives for outsiders to
devote resources toward the production

Or acquisition of information. This is

because insiders can acquire and disseminate information more quickly and at a
lower cost than outsiders.

As a consequence, resources are no longer

allocated toward t he socially suboptimal production of information.
'!his chapter has presented

two

distinct views of insider trading.

'!he

traditional view asserts that insider trading is harmful to outsiders and
should therefore be regulated.

Contrary to this widely held belief, several

alternative theories point out the potential benefits arising from this
practice.

Despite the critics' questioning of the current justification of

insider trading regulations, policy decisions strongly embrace the traditional
viewpoint. . '!he next chapter takes a look at existing regulations focusing on
their intentions as well as the methods and difficulties associated with their
enforcement.
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CHAPl'ER 3

The purpose of this section is to investigate the nature of federal
insider trading laws.

Emphasis will be placed on the intent and enforcement

policies associated with the var ious regulations.

In addition, an attenpt

will also be made to point out certain shortcomings or enforcemnent
difficulties which hinder the regulators in their efforts to prevent the abuse
of nonpublic information.

As stated earlier, federal legislation directed

taNard insider trading is found in Section 16 of the 1934 Securities Exchange
Act and in RIle 10b-5 prorulgated in 1942.
It was stated during the Congressional Hearings of 1933-1934 that Section
16 was "aimed at the general evil of officers and directors rigging their
stock up and down, and squeezing out their

0\'ll1

stockholder's. " (1)

The specific

type of activity to which this statement·refers is the famous (or, perhaps,
infamous) stock pools of the 1920's and earlier.

A stock pool consisted of a

number of corporate executives and directors who met and exchanged valuable
nonpublic market information. (2)

One tactic enployed by these pools required that insiders intentionally
time their purchases with the intent of causing a rise in price.

This, in

turn, would make a stock appear relatively strong thereby inducing further
purchasing by outsiders. (3)

.~

the price rose, t he members of the pool would

sell their shares and thus realize a profit.
A second tactic enployed by these pools was to release misleading

statements to the market which would result in large fluctuations in a stock's
price occuring during a relatively short time period.

These statements were

aimed primarily toward stock traders whose transactions were based upon
technical factors (e.g., volume or price). (4)
3-1

The misleading assertions made
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by the pools were often that heavy-buying was going on in a cor9cration's
shares.

This induced speculators to purchase shares with the hope of

profiting from some soon-to-be-announced good news.

However, since the

decision to release any information was ultimately left to the discretion of
the insiders, a stock's price would often decline before any news
public.

beca~

Consequently, the only persons who could be expected to consistently

profit from these price gyrations were the members of the stock pools.
The consensus during the 1933-1934 Congressional Hearings was that stock
pools and other similar practices engaged in by corporate insiders were
fradulent and manipulatory and resulted in financial injuury to shareholders.
In response to this widely held perception, the Section 16 legislation was
promulgated with the intent oE preventing unfair trading practices on G,e part
of insiders.
Section 16 is composed of three parts:

(a), (b), and (c).(5)

16 (a)

formally defines an insider as any person who is directly or indirectly the
beneficial owner of more than ten percent of any class of any equity security ,
or who is an officer or director of the issuer of such security. (6)
Additionally, 16 (a) imposes two requirements on insiders.

First, an insider

is required to file with the SEC, at the time of the registration of his
corporation's security or within ten days after he becomes a beneficial owner,
officer, or director, a statement of the amount of all equity securities
issued by his corporation of which he is the beneficial owner.

The specific

form on which this information is filed is the Form 3, ,formally referred to as
the "Initial Statement of Beneficial Ownership of Securities." The second
requirement made by l6(a) is that the insider must file a transaction report
within ten days after the close of each calendar month in which there has been
any change in his hOldings.

This filing is made on Form 4, the "Statement of

Changes in Beneficial Ownership of Securities. "
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Once received by the SEC, the information contained in the Fbrm 3 and Form
4 Statements is made available to the public.

In fact, the transactions data

contained on the Form 4' s (with the exception of options transactions) is
published monthly by the SEC in the Official Summary of Security Transactions
and Holdings.

'!'his publicity is intended to encourage voluntary maintenance

of proper fiduciary standards by those in control of corporations and, at the
same time, give public investors information as to purchases and sales by
insiders, which might, in turn, indicate their private opinion as to the
prospects of the corrpany.(7)

In addition, the listing of purchases and sales

of securities in these reports is useful in determinig whether a violation of
other Section 16 provisions has occurred.
Section 16 (b) outlaws what are loosely referred to as 'short swing I
transactions.

Specifically, this rule requires that profits realized by an

insider from any purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, of his corporation's
equity securities within a period of less than six months shall be returned to
.the corporation. (8)

Liability under 16(b) is determined irrespective of the

intentions of the insider entering into the transaction.. For instance,
suppose an insider purchases his corporation's stock on January 1 based on his
knowledge of an impending merger
concern.

a~ouncement

between his firm and another

If he sells his stock after July 1, he is not in violation of

16 (b)--regardless of the size of his profits and the fact that his trade was
based upon nonpublic information.

On

the other hand, if the insider sells his

stock prior to July 1, then he is liable under 16(b); however, this liability
merely implies that the insider must'give up his profits.

The fact that he

traded on inside information does not impose any further liabilities on him as
far as 16 (b) is concerned.

Although the penalty associated with a 16 (b)

violation may seem somewhat unexacting, a second example illustrates why a
stiffer penalty may be unjustified.
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Suppose an insider purchases shares of his corporation's stock on January
1 as part of an annual stock purchasing plan.
nonpublic information.

a~viously,

no resort is made to

Suppose that on April 1, this insider is in desperate

need of cash and is thus forc? _ to to liquidate a substantial portion of his

portfolio.

'£ his action triggers a l6(b) violation, and t he insider is forced

to give up any profits realized from his purchase on January 1.

In this case,

it would seem unfair to subject the insider to futher penalties simply because
he was in need of cash.
Part (b) of Section 16 was enacted primarily in response to abuses in
which insiders possessing material nonpublic information bought and sold their
corporation's securities, "as the circumstances warrented, based upon their
special knowledge.

The legislation was also promulgated with the intent of

rerroving incentives for insiders to engage in manipulatory activities (e.g.,
stock pools) designed to produce sudden changes in market prices in order to
obtain short swing profits.
Section l6(b) violations are detected by

c~ipUter.

Specifically, the SEC

continually feeds transactions data from the Form 4 Statements into a computer
which then determines, for each insider, whether at least six months have
elapsed between any purchase and sale or sale and purchase.

Although l6(b)

apparently applies to options trading, it is suprising to note that no
transactions data for options is fed into the computer. (9)

Hence, if an

insider's option transactions are scrutinized for l6(b) violations then the
process is performed by hand.

Given the scale of the task involved, this

explanation seems unlikely.
Finally, Section l6(c) prohibits insiders from engaging in short sales of
their corporation's equity securities. (lO)

The intent of this provision is to

rerrove the incentive for corporate managers to purposely make poor decisions
in order to profit from the ensuing decline in market prices.
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At first glance, Section 16 appears to be an effective deterrent to
insider trading abuses; however, three fundamental problems exist.

First,

these proscriptions apply only to registered insiders; i.e., those persons
described in 16 (a) •

In reality, the Section 16 definition of an insider

covers only a subset of all persons who regularly come in contact with inside
information.

Certainly there may not exist any practical solution to this

shortcoming; nevertheless, its existence suggests that investors will still
risk financial injury resulting from the practices which Section 16 was
designed to prevent.
A second problem with this Section is that it applies solely to an
insider's transactions in the securities issued by his corporation.

No

restrictions are placed on an insider's transactions in the securities of
other corporations.
Finally, the third shortcoming associated with Section 16 is that its
provisions place no restricitons on an insider's ability to profit from a
market position subsequent to the passage of the six month period described in
l6(b).

Conceivably, an insider could base his trading decisons on.nonpublic

information and, in order. to conform to Section 16, simply wait six months
before realizing his gains.

The fact that the insider has an unfair advantage

over outside investors when making his initial transaction would go
unpunished.

In this scenario, the only effect l6(b) has is to increase the

insider's investment risk by requiring him to hold his position for at least
six months.
The existence of the problems just mentioned prorrpted the SEC to
promulgate Rule lOb-5 in 1942.

This proscription currently serves as the

priwary statutory deterrent to the abuse of nonpublic information.
that Rule lOb-5 states in part:

Recall
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It shall be unlawful for any ~erson, directly or indirectly, .•. to make
any untrue stat~nent of a material fact or omit to state a material
fact ... in connection 'tlith the purchase or sale of any security. (11)
'!'his Rule is particularly significant for. two reasons.

first, it

exolicitly prohibits persons from engaging in security transactions on the
basis of material information

wi~~t

prior disclosure of such information.

(For this reason the proscri?ton is often referred to as the "disclose or
abstain" rule . ) The second feature of Rule lOb-5 which war rents attention is
that it applies not only to registered insiders as defined in Section 16 but
to all persons.

This effectively means that any person coming in contact with

what he knows to be inside information is prohibited from utilizing this
special knowledge for the purpose of making trading decisions until that
knowledge has been publicly disclosed.
'!'he primary intent of Rule lOb-5 is to promote informational equality
between all buyers and sellers in securities markets.

It is also devoted to

assuring that information disseminated to the investing public is both
complete and accurate.
Given the ambitious nature of the prohibition, one is inrnediatley led to
question the extent to which it can be effectively enforced.

Specifically,

one may ask, how do the regUlators intend to detect violations of Rule lOb-5?

And further, once a possible violation has been detected, is there a
reasonable chance of obtaining a conviction?
In response to the first question, the sa::: as well as the self-regulated
stock exchanges are committed to detecting security transactions based upon
material, nonoublic information.

'!he Stock Watch Department of the New York

Stock Exchange has an elaborate COlIPllter system designed to detect unusual
trading activity.

The smaller exchanges and the

sa::: also monitor markets with

the aid of computers; however, their systems are much less sophisticated than
the NYSE system.

3-7

Specifically, the Stock Watch system continually monitors the price and
volwne rrovements of all NYSE traded stocks.

These conputers are programned

with an elaborate set of predetermined statistical boundaries which are
violated when a stock's price rroves up or down at an unusually rapid pace or
when a stock trades at an unusually high volume.

The detection of trading

patterns which penetrate these boundaries is not an unusual oc:currance; there
are literally thousands of false alarms. (12)

Nevertheless, the Stock Watch

Deparbcent attempts to investigate all such transactions by following a
procedure designed t o eliminate trades which are not based on inside
information.

when an unusual price or volwne movement is detected in the

stock of some corporation, an irrmediate check is made to determine whether any
news was released regarding that firm.

If

this is not the case, then the

company is contacted directly and asked to provide a possible explanation for
the unusual trading activity in its stock.

finally, if the company is unable

to provide any answers, brokers are contacted and an effort is made to learn
the identities of the persons or institutions that have traded in the stock.
Furthermore, an attempt is made to determine whether these traders are linked
in any way to company insiders.

When it becomes evident that th!,! market

flurries were a conseguence of trading based on inside information, the Stock
Watch

Deparb~nt

notifies the SEC which then joins in the investigation.

This

occurs because the SEC has the power to bring charges against anyone violating
feder al insider tradi ng laws , whereas the self-regulated exchanges have
jurisdiction only over their member firms. (13)
The role played by the SEC in detecting trading on inside information is
relatively limited.

In addition to a small conputer system which is capable

of tracking a couple hundred stocks, the SEC examines the transaction reports
(Form 4' s) submitted by registered insiders.

the specific procedure followed
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involves an

examination of Form 4 Statements in relation to a specific

~ ~

news event which causes a revaluation of the market price of one or more
stocks.

For instance, suppose a proposed merger between the tWQ corporations

ABC and XYZ is announced during the month of '>lay.

As a result of this

announcement there is a significant appreciation in the price of both firms'
equity securities.

The SEC responds to this event by examining all Form 4

Statements submitted by insiders of ABC and XYZ during the months leading up
to the announcement.,

(The actual number of months examined may vary depending

upon the importance of the news event in question.)
were made by insiders of

ei~,er

If any large purchases

firm during the months just prior to the

announcement, then the SEC may charge the insider(s) involved with a 10b-5
violation.

Whe~,er

or not these charges are filed depends upon whether the

SEC feels its case would hold up in court.

This, in turn, depends upon the

volume of the transactions as well as their timing in relation to the
announcement date.
There are several impediments to these detection procedures followed by
the exchanges and the SEC.
few 10b-5 violations.

As one might expect, the SEl: detects r,e latively

This is due to the limited capability of its computer

system and to the fact that few insiders are foolish enough to commit an
-

obvious 10b-5 violation and then register the trade with the SEl:.
The Stock Watch Department which is credited with the majority of
detections also faces a number of problems.

For instance, a person trading on

inside information can easily avoid detection by keeping the volume of his
trade in line with normal volume patterns.

This tactic takes advantage of the

fact that the exchange computers are programmed to detect only relatively
large volume trades or those transactions having a marked effect on a
security's price.
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Another strategy which has consistently befuddled investigators involves
executing trades through a Swiss Bank account in order to conceal one's
identity.

Since neither the SEC nor the JustiCE Department has jurisdic t ion

over foreign institutions, they are .prevented from determining the identities
of customers on whose part these institutions are acting. (14)
even if the customers are U.S. citizens.

This is true

Thus, according to one source,

"Someone with a Swiss bank account and access to inside information can
usually run roughshod through the financial markets, with little likelihood of
being caught." (15)
Finally, the strategy which many perceive to be the most widely used and
potentially least risky from a legal standpoint is for insiders to trade
through third parties.

For instance, an insider of XYZ Corporation possessing

inside knowledge of an impending merger between XYZ and ABC can contact his
brother-in-law and instruct him to purchase several hundred shares of XYZ
steck on the day preceding the announcement, and to sell those shares
immediately following the adjustment in price.
effective for two reasons.

This strategy is extremely

First, it is unlikely that the trade will be

detected since the volume consists of only several hundred shares. (16)

And

second, even if the transaction is disccvered, there is little likelihood of
establishing proof that the trader possessed inside information and based his
trading decision upon such knowledge.
Now

that the precedures and problems associated with detecting lOb-5

violations have been examined, it is necessary to consider what transpires
after a possible violation is detected.

Recall the question posed earlier:

"Q1ce a possible violation has been detected, is there a reasonable chance of
obtaining a conviction?" Based upon the SEC's record to date, the answer to
this question is erost certainly no.

Although the maxi.mJm penalty for a
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criminal conviction under Rule 10b-5 is five years in jail and a
the Justice

Deparb~nt

has secured only five convictions since

~lO,OOO

1~42.

fine,

(17)

The

reasons underlying this paucity of convictions shall now be discussed.
Tb successfully convict a person on criminal charges of violating Rule
10b-5 through trading on inside information, it must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt that the person knowingly failed to disclose material facts
prior to making his trade. (18)

Proving this usually requires drawing a link

between the accused and an insider of the coopany whose securities that person
traded.

But even in cases where there exists an apparent link between trader

and insider there remain problems of prcof.

States one SEC surveillance

official,
We look into two or three unusual run-ups a week, and more than half the

time we can trace the activity to people who might have been in a position
But proving they had the information, and
acted because of it, is usually impossible. These people always have a
plausible story, and we can't disprove it without getting into their
heads.
to have inside information.

Due to the overwhelming difficulties associated with criminal prosecution,
the SEC has been inclined to settle. all but the most egregious violations
through civil suits.

The maximum penalty the SEC can win through such suits

is 'disgorgement' (the repayment of trading profits), and an injuoction
against further violations. (20)

In signing this injunction, which is known as

a 'consent decree,' the accused neither admits nor denys guilt but agrees
never to commit a violation in the future.

Once the defendent agrees to this

type of settlement, the agency is usually willing to drop the case to avoid a

costly tr ial.
It is fairly obvious that the civil penalties for trading on inside
information are lenient relative to the corresponding criminal penalties.
FUrthermore, the fact that civil suits are standard procedure for all but the
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IlDst egregious violations has led many to question the deterrent effect of the
SEC's enforcement efforts. (21) Aware of this criticism, the SeC has begun
urging Congress to raise the civil penalties for trading on inside
information.

Under the proposed legislaton, insiders would be liable for

their profits, plus a civil penalty of as much as three times that arnount.(22 )
This chapter has presented an examination of the current federal insider
trading regulations--specifically, those comprising Section 16 of the 1934 SEA
and Rule 10b-5.

Although the Section 16 proscriptions appear relatively

straightforward, several shortcomings are evident.

In particular, Section 16

applies only to trades by registered insiders · in the securities of their
corporation; further, it fails to explicitly prohibit trading on inside
information.

'fbese oversights provided partial impetus for the promulgation

of Rule lOb-5 in 1942, which requires all persons to truthfully disclose all
material information in connection with a securities transaction or to abstain
from engaging in that transaction.

The purpose of this regulation is to

prOl1Dte fairness in securities markets through rellDving the informational
advantages possessed by insiders.

Unfortunately, the

a~itious

nature of this

regUlation has led to recurring difficulties in detecting and successfully
prosecuting offenders.

FurtherllDre, the effective penalty for violating this

rule (i.e., the civil penalty) has been described as little IlDre than a "slap
on the wrist."(23)

Consequently, the effectiveness of the SEC's enforcement

efforts in both identifying and detering violations of insider trading laws
has been drawn into question.
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CHAPl'ER 4

Although a great deal of literature has been published regarding the
subject of insider trading, the range of these studies has been rather narrow.
The vast majority of articles have either involved deductive arguments
concerning the desirability of the practice or enpirical examinations of the
excess returns which accrue to insiders as a result of their trading
activities.

These studies have seldom dealt specifically with the subject of

insider trading regulations; however, the findings of IlOSt enpirical works do
have inplications regarding regulatory effectiveness.
The bulk of past enpirical studies has been concerned, in one way or
another, with determining whether and/or in relation to what events do excess
returns accrue to insiders from their trading in the stock market.

Given that

trading based on inside information is illegal, these studies have indirect
implications regarding the effectiveness of the SEC's policing of
activity.

~nsider

The findings of several studies which are representative of the

type of work that has been done in this area during the past fifteen years
will be examined in this chapter.
In 1968 Lorie and Niederhoffer [27J published a paper in which they
determined, contrary to the conclusion of almost all previous studies, that
''proper and prOllpt analysis of data on insider trading can be profitable. " (1)
Their study involved three separate analyses of insider trading data.
The first question they asked was whether insiders generally bought shares
of stock prior to good news.

'lb

answer this they examined, in three ways,

insider transactions before large changes in a stock's price.

First, by

examining the last insider transaction occurring before the large price change
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they observed that the odds favoring a large positive change were 2.5:1 after
a purchase and 1.1:1 after a sale.

Second, their analysis of the net

purchases (total purchases minus total sales) during the six months prior to
the large price change yielded odds of 2.2:1 favoring an increase in prices
when the net number of purchases was positive.

Third, by examining net shares

purchased (total shares purchased minus total shares sold) in the six months
leading up to the large price IlDVement they still found evidence (though less
significant than in the previous two cases) that insiders demonstrated skill
in forcasting large price changes.
The second test perforrred by L&N was concerned wi th determining the
significance of the relationship between intensive insider trading and
subsequent price IlDVements in stock prices.

Tb gain further information

regarding the possibility for outsiders to profitably utilize insider trading
data, percentage changes in price were cOll'Puted over a six month period
beginning with the date on which the insiders' transactions were made public.
The results indicated a strong relationship between insider trading and
subsequent price movements.

During months when the number of inside buyers

exceeded the number of inside sellers by at least two, the probability was
about .60 that the stock would outperform the IllIA during the six months
following the disclosure date.

Conversely, when the number of sellers

exceeded the number of buyers by at least two, the probability was about .64
that the stock would perform worse than the IllIA during the six month period
subsequent to disclosure.
As their t hird test , L&N attellpted, unsuccessfully, to determine whether

there existed companies in which the insiders were consistently more
suocessful in predicting price IlDVements than were insiders in general.
on the results of their study, L&N proposed that the "SEX:: and the stock

Based
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exchange should be encouraged to provide faster and more complete
dissemination of insider trading data" to promote greater informational
efficiency in the stock market. (2)
A 1974 study by Jeffery Jaffe [19] attenpted to ' inprove upon the
methodological techniques used in previous studies and to resolve the
conflicting opinions regarding the profitability of insider trading.

His

results took into account transactions costs, the relative risk (volatility)
of different securities, and general market conditions.
and

In response to Lorie

Niederhoffer's conclusions regarding the profitability of basing one's

trading decisions on insider trading data, Jaffe also examined the information
content of the Official Summary of Security Transactions and Holdings.

His

results were based upon the computed abnormal returns on securities subsequent
to specific types of insider trading activity.

The findings indicated that

insiders did possess valuable information; furthermore, much of the
information contained in these trades remained undiscounted by the date of
their publication in the Official Summary.

When transactions costs were

considered, however, the majority of the holding period returns OOlI'pUted
earlier could no longer be considered statistically large.

In his concluding

remarks, Jaffe professed that "the results indicating that trading on inside
information is widespread suggest that insiders actually do violate security
regulations ... (3)
In 1976 Joseph E. Finnerty [131 published his study "Insiders and Market
Efficiency" in which he tested the strong-form of the efficient market
hypothesis.

The strong-form assumes that all currently known information is

fully reflected in pries; in other words, no individual can have above average
expected returns because of monopolistic access to information. (4) He noted
that the results of previous studies had served as sufficient tests of the
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semi-strong form (i. e., all publicly available information being reflected in
prices) but were unacceptable for testing the strong-form.

The reason being

that the sanples used in the earlier works were selected on the basis of a
great preponderance of insider trades in a single direction, thus the computed
returns were larger than those expected for the "average" insider.

To rellDVe

this bias, Finnerty tested the performance of the entire population of
insiders who register their trades with the SEC.

Not suprisingly, his results

indicated that insiders were able to outperform the market by identifying both
positive and negative situations within their corporation.

This finding was

incongruous with the assumptions made by the strong-form of the efficient
market hypothesis.
Further research investigating the profitability of insider trading was
presented in a 1979 study by Baesel and Stein [3].
of Jaffe and Finnerty with three modifications.

Their work paralleled that

First, the analysis in this

work was performed using data from stocks on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE).
Second, B&S conpared the returns associated with the trading activity of two

subgroups of insiders: bank directors and ordinary insiders.

Finally, a

randomly drawn control sanple was included for purpose of coaparison with the
performance of insiders.

The analysis yielded three important results.

First, both bank directors and ordinary insiders earned excess returns
relative to an uninformed trading strategy (the control sample).

This result

was not in keeping with the strong-form of the efficient market hypothesis.
Second, the premiums earned by the group of bank directors was significantly
larger than those earned by ordinary insiders.

Finally, the results were

inconsistent with the semi-strong form of the efficient market hypothesis
since the premiums did not accrue to the insiders until several months after
the simulated trade--subsequent to the normal period before insider
transactions data was released to the public.
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The final three pieces reviewed are directed lIDre toward examining the
SEC's effectiveness in policing the market for insider trading abuses.

The

first is a 1974 article by Jeffery Jaffe [20J entitled "The Effect of
Regulation OJanges on Insider Trading." Given the results of previous studies
which determined that insiders do possess valuable market information, Jaffe
set out to conpare the extent of their use of that information during time
per iods imnediately before and after iIrportant regulatory events.

The

three

events chosen were (1) the Cady, Boberts decision (1961), (2) the Texas Gulf
Sulfur indictment (1965), and (3) the Texas Gulf Sulfur decision (1966).

(See

Appendices 2 and 3 for descriptions of these events.) In particular, the study
examined profitability and volume changes in insider trading immediately
following these events.
The findings indicated that the changes in the average profitability of
insider trades after the case law events were not significantly different from
the average profitability before the events.

FurtherllDre, Jaffe's use of

lIDnthly as well as daily market volume figures did not indicate that the
regulatory events had any effect on the magnitude of insider trading.
Finally, there was no evidence suggesting that the three events had any
cumulative effect on the profitability of insider trading.

Jaffe concluded

that his results "do not suggest that the recent regulation of insiders is
effective, casting doubt on the value of this regulation to society." (5)
Keown and Pinkerton [22], in their 1981 study, approached the question of
regulatory effectiveness from a different angle.

Their concern was with the

possib.l e leakage of unannounced takeover plans, due to insider trading, on
daily stock price lIDVementS in advance of the planned takeover announcements.
Unlike lIDst previous studies of insider trading, this one drew its data from
Standard and Poor's Leily Stock Price Record.

It was pointed out that since
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nearly all earlier studies obtained their data from the SEC's Official
Summary, the observations and conclusions of these studies applied only to
registered insiders.

K&P held the opinion that a thorough analysis of

regulatory effectiveness RUst not ignore undisclosed trades based on inside
information (i.e., illegal insider trading).

Therefore, their test involved

an examination of daily holding period returns for the stocks of 194
successfully acquired firms on 157 trading days surrounding the announcement
date.
The findings indicated significant increases in volume occurring as early
as three weeks prior to announcement.

It was noted, however, that these rises

in volume were not a result of trading by registered insiders.

According to

K&P, the dramatic increases in volume in conjunction with the absence of
trading by registered insiders suggested that insiders may have frequently
traded through third parties to avoid detection.
Concerning abnormal price movements, the results suggested the existence
of substantial trading based on the unreleased takeover plans beginning
approximately one month prior to the announcement date.

During the final five

to eleven days inrne<'liately preceding the announcement, there was "uncontrolled
abuse of RIle lOb-5. n (6) K&P observed that approximately half of the total
price movement attributed to the merger information occurred prior to the
announcement date.

The remaining market reaction occurred on the day of

disclosure with a IlUCh smaller price movement occurring the following day.
This apparent lag in adjustment was attributed to the fact that some
announcements were made subsequent to the market's close; hence, K&P's
findings supported the semi-strong form of the efficient market hypothesis.
The conclusion was made that "inpending merger announcements are poorly held
secrets, and trading on this nonpublic information abounds. " (7)
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The !lOst recent paper dealing with insider trading is Perman's [38J
"Insider Trading and the Dis"s emination of Firms Forcast Information." The
pur9Qse of this work was to establish whether a link exists between insider
trading and information dissemination.

Given that RJ.le lOb-5 prohibits

insider trading on the basis of nonpublic information, this study could also
be seen as a test of the current effectiveness of the SEC's enforcement
policies.

Unlike the previous study by Keown and Pinkerton, Perman's

transactions data included only registered trades (i.e., those contained in
the Official Summary).

The analysis was performed in two stages.

First,

there was an examination of the association between the timing of insiders'
trades and subsequent earnings forcasts.

Secooo, measures were made of the

abnormal returns to insiders as a result of their trading activity prior to
these disclosures.
To determine whether insiders timed their trades relative to earnings

forcast announcements, Perman first computed average daily abnormal security
returns for a sample of 550 iooividual firms during periods of time before and
after announcements of corporate earnings forcasts.

These abnormal returns

represented estimates of the returns one would capture from basing trading
decisions on the forcast information.

Next, he pooled this data and computed

the 'on average' abnormal return one would receive from trading on any given
day surrounding a typical earnings forcast announcement.

Also, for individual

firms the magnitude of the daily abnormal returns was examined for the three
day period leading up to and including the announcement date.
ranked these firms based on the size of their returns:

Penman then

firms at the top had

the highest abnormal returns while firms at I::l .e bottom had the lowest.
list of firms was then grouped into twenty nonoverlapping portfolios.

This
If

insiders timed their trades relative to the forcast announcements, one would

4-8
expect to see an abundance of insider purchases (positive net purchases) prior
to announcement in the high ranking portfolios and an abundance of sales

(negative net purchases) prior to announcement in the low ranking portfolios.
Within each protfolio, insider trading activity was examined during a nine
month period surrounding each earnings forcast announcement.

This period

consisted of the month in which the announcement was made (IOOnth 0) and the
four lOOI'lths preceding (-1 to -4) and following (1 to 4) this lOOI'lth.

For each

of these months, the net nuntJer of insider purchases (purchases minus sales)
was computed for each firm; this number was then averaged over all firms
contained in each portfolio to obtain the mean net purchases per lOOI'lth.

For

each portfolio, Penman coopared the mean net purchases during a given period
prior to the announcement with the mean net purchases in the corresponding
period subsequent to the announcement.

For instance, associated with a

forcast announcement resulting in an upward revaluation of a firm's stock, one
might expect to see a larger number of net purchases in lOOnth -1 than in lOOnth
1.

Penman found that in 15 of the 20 portfolios, mean net purchases in lOOnth

o before

the forcast date relative to those in lOOnth 0 after the forcast date

were in the direction predicted by the sign of the mean abnormal return.
FurtherlOOre, of the five exceptions, only one fell in the top six or bottom
six portfolios where one would expect the pattern to be the strongest.

After

repeating this analysis for the other four IOOnths, Penman noted that "while
purchases and sales with respect to good news forcasts appear to take place
close to the forcast date, trading with respect to bad news is only evident
two lOOnths out from the forcast lOOnth." (8)
Penman's findings indicated that corporate insiders do time their trades
in relation to upcoming earnings forcasts in order to capture the value of the
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inforllation contained in those announcerrents; and that there exist significant
abnorllal returns associated with trading inforllation.
Insiders apparently respond to the incentive to take market positions on
the basis of infor!lation they publicly announce. The disincentives of a
potential SEC investigation are not sufficient to eliminate this
incentive •••• (9)
The implications of the studies just reviewed can be sUlllllarized as
follows.
the

Corporate insiders can and do execute profitable trades based upon

valuable infor!lation which they possess.

Sate

of these trades are made

directly and disclosed to the SEC while others are llade indirectly through
third parties or through other rrethods; all, however, are in violation of Rule
10b-5.
The apparent ineffectiveness of current enforcerrent policies can be
attributed to a number of factors.

Figuring prominently among these are the

high costs of enforcerrent and the difficulties in proving that given behavior
constitutes a violation.

The existence of such limitations has dictated a

selection policy which giyes priority to cases in which there exists
significant evidence of wrongdoing.

In other 'h':Jrds, only the most egregious

violations ever risk detection or investigaton.
by

This reasoning is supported

the findings of the studies just examined.
First, recall that the results of Keown and Pinkerton's analysis suggest

that the SEC is successful in reducing the incentives for insiders to trade on
nonpublic inforllation of llajor significance, particularly rrerger or takeover
announcerrents •
••• 76 percent of the firms studied experienced no open !larket purchases or
sales by registered insiders during the month prior to the announcement
date. Further, only 12 percent of the sarrple firms had positive net open
llarket purchases during the month prior to the announcerrent date. (10)
Pen!lan'S

findings, en the other hand, indicate that where events of

non-major significance are concerned--in this case, announcements of annual
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earnings forcasts--the incentive for insiders to trade based on this
information is not significantly diminished by the possibility of an SEC
investigation.
The empirical evidence suggests that the SEC has developed a set of
priorities regarding the current direction of its enforcement activities.
Indeed, the head of the SEC's disclosure policy office has stated, "The abuse
the agency is trying to curb is very flagrant." (11) These priorities have
arisen due to enforcement difficulties associated with insider trading
regulations.

Thus,

The investigators are forced to concentrate on cases in which the offence
seems particularly gross, or in which the offenders are immediately
obvious, or in which there are plenty of good clues, or in which they have
been tiJ;Ped off. (12)
This policy allows for roost trades by registered insiders to go unchecked,
thus providing incentives for violating Rule 10b-5.

In particular, one might

expect to find a preponderance of 10b-5 violations associated with events
which result in relatively small revaluations in security prices-for instance
earnings or earnings forcast announcements as opposed to merger or takeover
announcements.

For reasons which will be pointed out in Chapter 6, this study

will examine insider transactions associated with earnings announcements.
First, however, given what has been learned about the nature and enforcement
of insider trading regulations thus far, it is necessary to assess the
possibilities for an insider to profitably trade based upon his special
information with little risk from both a legal and financial standpoint.
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CHAPl'ER 5

The pr irna facie case for regulation of insider trading is based upon the
perceived harm, both individual and social, arising from this practice.
Assuming the perceived harm exists, then successful elimination of the basic
informational inequalities between corporate insiders and public investors
requires that two conditions be satisfied.

First, regulations !lUst be

accurate in the sense that they rust prevent all types of insider trading
activity which would be considered harmful.

Second, the restrictions !lUst be

enforced to the point where the marginal enforcement costs are no greater than
the marginal loss from IlOre insider trading.
It is the thesis of this paper that the current regulations of insider
trading are neither accurately stated nor adequatley enforced, thus enabling
insiders

to

earn excess returns as a result of their informational advantage

while subjecting themselves to negligible amounts of legal and downside risk.
Legal risk shall be defined as the probability that a violation is detected by
the regulators and criminal charges filed, and downside risk as the
probability that the actual return on a market position will be negative.
Insiders can obtain excess returns through utilizing trading strategies which
involve a violation of the full disclosure requirement of RIle lOb-5 and the
circumvention of various provisions of Section 16 of the 1934 Securities
Exchange kt.
Based

upon the findings of the previous two chapters, this portion of the

paper will present several trading guidelines which enable insiders to
significantly reduce the amount of legal risk associated with a violation of
RIle lOb-5.

Additionally, three trading strategies will be described which
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allow for major reductions in downside risk through circumventing Section
16(b):

the short swing rule.

Use of one of these trading strategies in

conjunction with the aforementioned guidelines represents a powerful device
for skirting the federal insider trading laws.

I t should be noted that the

trading techniques described in this study apply only to registered insiders
trading aboveboard, i.e., those who disclose their transactions to the SEX:.
A set of guidelines for reducing the legal risk associated with insider
transactions !lUst be based upon the enforcement tactics currently ellployed by
the regulators.

Recall from Chapter 3 that the SEX: examines the timing and

volume of trades by registered insiders prior to public disclosure of
pertinent information.

The greater the consequence of the information in

terms of price revaluation, the closer the SEX: scruitinizes the pre-disclosure
trades.

As a further deterrent, the Stock Watch Department of the New York

Stock Exchange follows, throughout the trading day, the price and volume
JlDVements of all 'big board' stocks.

The aIIIJUI1t of legal risk associated with

a given insider transaction can thus be defined as a function of (1) the depth
of the market for the insider's corporation's securities; (2) the volume of
the insider's trade relative to normal volume patterns; (3) the timing of the
trade relative to the date on which information is publicly disclosed; and (4)
the iIIportance of the information upon which the trade is based.
Market depth is defined as the existence of a large number of buyers and
sellers.

Ceteris paribus, the market depth for a given security is inversely

related to the price elasticity of demand for that security.

On the other

hand, the volume of a transaction in a certain stock is directly related to

the effect of that transaction on the stock's price.

Thus, an insider runs a

greater risk of having his trades spotted by the Stock watch computers if he
is

~ading

in a shallow market or in large quantity.
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'!be timing of t rades merits consideration since the shorter the period of
time between the insider's trade and the subsequent date of disclosure, the
greater the likelihood of an SEC investigation.

Finally, an insider is more

likely to come under investigation if his trades are based on information of
major significance than if his trades are based on less significant events.
Consequently, an insider wishing to trade based on his knowledge of nonpublic
information may reduce his legal risk by loosely adhering to a set of
guidelines based upon current regulatory enforcement tactics.

'!bese

guidelines can be stated as follows (in descending order of importance).
1.

Trade on information of lesser significance.

2. Trade well in advance of the date on which relevant information is
made public. ·
3. Keep trading volume relatively low or trade in relatively deep
markets.
Due to their interdependent nature, it is possible for an insider to ignore
one or more of these guidelines and still maintain a low level of legal risk.
'!be conditions just presented enable the inside trader to reduce the legal
risk associated with a violation of &lie lOb-5.

However, the desirability of

a given amount of legal risk can only be assessed through consideration of the
relative amount of downside risk.

'!be existence of this tradeoff necessitates

an examination of downside risk from the perspective of corporate insiders.
~

better understand downside risk, imagine a sucurities market in which

insiders are permitted to trade freely.

In this scenario no legal risk

exists, and therefore, insiders attempt to minimize downside risk.

'!bis can

be accomplished, in part, through trading on information of major significance
and trading in large quantity.

Assuming the insider has correctly predicted

the market's reaction to his information, there seems to be little chance that
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his trade could be unprofitable.

However, all transactions involve some

amount of investment risk; i.e., there is always some probability that the
actual return on a market position will diverge from the expected return.

As

long as there exists some amount of investment risk, the possibility of a
negative return remains.

Nevertheless, investment risk can be reduced,

ceteris paribus, by decreasing the length of the holding period.

Thus, in the

unregulated market, the insider can minimize his downside risk by holding his
market position for a length of time no longer than the period required for
the information to be fully incorporated in price.

For instance, if the

insider possesses positive, nonpublic information he will disclose the
information Unmediately after he has purchased ·shares of his corporation's
stock and proceed to sell those shares as soon as the information released has
been illpOUnded in the stock's price.

This scheme will minimize the insider's

vulnerability to price fluctuations not related to the information that was
released.

Therefore, when insiders are permitted to trade freely, two tactics

can be employed to minimize downside risk: (1) trade on information of major
consequence; and (2) minimize the holdiDJ period.
with the regulation that exists in today's securities markets, adherance
to these two guidelines will result in egregious violations of federal insider

trading proscriptions.

Both tactics serve to increase the amount of legal

risk associated with 10b-5 violations; furthermore, the second tactic is also
a violation of Section 16(b) which prohibits short swing transactions.

It has

previously been shown that Rule 10b-5 is not effectively enforced, but that
violations of Section 16(b) are easily detected.

Therefore, unless ·an insider

can find a loophole in 16(b), he will be unable to reduce his downside risk
without similarly increasing his legal risk.
rule is in order.

A closer examination of this
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Section 16 (b) of the 1934 SPA reads, in part, as follows:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have
been obtained by [an officer, director or principal stockholder] by reason
of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any
purchase and sale, or and sale and purchase, of any equity security of
such issuer ••• wi thin any per iod of less than six months •• . !:hall inure to
and be recoverable by the issuer •••• (1)
Recall that for a regulation to successfully achieve its desired purpose, it
RUst be both effectively enforced and accurately stated.

As was seen in

Cllapter 3, 16(b) violations by registered insiders are detected by computer;
thus an attenpt .a t violating this provision would likely be unsuccessful.
Though this rule appears to be effectively enforced, it is deficient in the
sense that it fails to prohibit the use of trading strategies which would be
considered violations of its original intent.

That is, the opportunity exists

for insiders to follow trading scherres which remain faithful to the language
but not the purpose of Section 16 (b) •
Recall that for the downside risk of a position to be eliminated, it is 'a t
least necessary to remove all investment risk; and the most obvious way to
remove investment risk is to close out that position, i.e., sell and realize
the current gain (or loss).

Theoretically, one could also remove all

investment risk by 'locking in' (defering) a current gain until sometime in
the future.

In reality, no such investment instrurrent exists which would

enable an investor to do this.

Nevertheless, through utilizing an option

writing strategy, an investor can defer a current gain to a future date with
an almost total reduction in investrrent risk and a proportional decrease in
downside risk. (2) Suprisingly, Section 16 contains no proscriptions regarding
this type of trading behavior, and thus, it appears that the short swing rule
can be circumvented.
Three trading scherres for use by registered insiders will now be
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presented .
and

Each makes use of stock option strategies to skirt Section 16 (b)

thereby reduce the insider's anount of downside risk.

Since there is no

explicit violation of 16(b) , use of these strategies will not increase legal
risk.

The first two schemes are designed to take advantage of positive inside

information, while the third enables the insider to circumvent Section 16(c)
by profiting from negative information.
The first strategy allows the insider to lock in an unrealized stock gain
by writing an in-the-llOney call option on that stock.

(The term 'lock in'

will be used even though there remains some amount of investment risk.) This
strategy is not a violation of Section 16(b) since both positions (the stock
and the call) are held for at least six nonths.

The initial position (the

purchase of stock) takes place sometime after the insider acquires knowledge
of the positive, nsnpublic information.

The insider can reduce his downside

risk by making this pruchase closer to the announcement date; however, the
resulting rise in legal risk must be mitigated through one of the other three
factors (significance of information, trading volume, or market depth).

On

the date of public disclosure, the stock's price will immediately rise to
reflect this new information.

Ideally the insider would sell at this time in

order to minimize his downside riSk; however, to avoid a 16(b) violation he
wr i tes an in-the""l1X>l1ey call option on the shares of stock he purchased prior
to

the announcement.

which to choose.

Typically, there will be several in-the""\OOl'ley calls from

A call which is more deeply in-the""l1X>l1eY will lead to a

greater reduction in investment risk by more effectively locking in the
unrealized gain.
potential.

On

This implies diminished downside risk as well as upside

the other hand, writing a call which is not so deeply

in-the""l1X>l1eY will allow for further upside gains though the downside risk is
also increased.
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Once the strike price has been chosen, the expiration date must be decided
upon.

To avoid a 16(b) violation, the option !lUst expire no sooner than six

IIDnths after it is written.

Depending upon what date the insider wishes to

write the call, he may have a choice between the intermediate and long term
contracts or be forced to write the long term option.

It is highly unlikely

that the date signifying the end of the six month period will coincide with
the expiration date.

Thus after the six IIDnth period has elapsed, the insider

may close out both positions by selling the stock and repurchasing the call.
Alternatively, both positions can be held until the option expires.

If the

latter plan is chosen and the call is in-thellOney on the date of expiration,.
then the call will automatically be exercised, i.e., the insider will be
required to sell his shares.

On the other hand, if the option is

out-of-thellOney (i.e., the strike price exceeds the stock price) on the
expiration date, then the call will expire worthless and the insider may
choose between keeping or selling his shares.
One question which may ar ise regarding this strategy is whether an insider
would be held in violation of 16(b) in the unlikely event that the call option
is exercised prior to the passage of the six IIDnth period, forcing him to sell
his shares.

The answer is no.

According to Rule 16b-3, insiders are exempted

from Section 16(b) in the case that they make delivery of shares of stock as
payment for the exercise of an option.

This is a result of the SEX:: I S long

held "view that transactions such as these do not readily lend themselves to
the abuse of inside information and should not automatically be subject to the
recovery provisions of Section 16 (b) • n (3) Ironically, the insider would
actually benefit from exercise prior to the expiration date.

A second

explanation of Strategy 1 can be illustrated by the following example.
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A is on the board of directors of XYZ Corporation.

On

Apr i l 5, 1980 A

learns that the first quarter profits for XYZ rose to record levels, far
exceeding analysts' predictions.

Realizing that XYZ is currently undervalued

by the market, A decides to make a stock purchase in advance of the inpending

increase in its price.

On

April 6 A purchases

per share; his initial investment is $25,000.

sao

shares of XYZ comron at $50

XYZ releases its quarterly

earnings report on April 14, and the price of XYZ stock jUIlps to $55 per
share.

A decides that the earnings news has been conpletely incorporated into

the stock's price and wishes to lock in his unrealized profit of $5 per share.
On

April 15 A writes the XYZ O:tober 45 calls currently selling for $14 ($10

of intrinsic value plus $4 of time value premium).
$7000.

On

For this he receives

O:tober 21, 1980 (over six months later) A's call option expires.

If on that day XYZ stock is selling for more than $45 per share, the option

will automatically be exercised and A's 500 shares of XYZ stock will be called
away at $45 per share.

Alternatively, if XYZ is selling for $45 per share or

less, then the calls will expire worthless and A will sell the stock at the
prevailing market price.

(It is assumed for the purpose of this illustration

that A has no desire to hold the stock once the expiration date has passed.)
Table 1 shows the profitability of this strategy given various prices for XYZ
stock on the date of expiration.

The corresponding profit graph is depicted

in Figure l.
The table reveals that A's position will remain profitable if XYZ stock
sells for above $36 per share on the expiration date.

The maximum profit of

$9 per share (a total gain of $4,500) will be realized if XYZ stock is selling
at or above $45. ' In a cash account, this trading technique would require an
investment of $18,000 ($25,000 - $7,000).
potential of $4500.

The write has a maximum profit

The potential return from this position can be

Table 1
Profit Table for Insider Trading Strategy 1

PRICES CN EXPIRATICN MTE

STOCK

CALL

PK)FIT
PER SHARE

PIVFIT
PER SHARE

TOl'AL
PK)FIT
PER SHARE

XYZ

XYZ OCT

STOCK SOLD

STOCK

45 CALL

(CALLED) AT

30

0

30

-20

14

-6

35

0

35

-15

14

-1

36

0

36

-14

14

0

40

0

40

-10

14

4

45

0

45

-5

14

9

50

5

(45)

-5

14

9

55

10

(45)

-5

14

9

60

15

(45)

-5

14

9

65

20

(45)

-5

14

9
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approximated as $4,500/$18,000, a 25 percent gain for the period during which
the position was held (aboot 6 1/2 months).

If the write were done in a

margin account, the return would be considerably higher.

Note that dividends

paid by the underlying stock and commission charge have been ignored.
The second strategy involves writing an in-the-money put prior to the
release of important information and subsequently writing an in-the-mcney
covered call.

This strategy implicitly assumes that the insider already owns

enough shares in his corporation I s stock to Cover the call.

This call rust be

covered in order to avoid a possible violation of Section 16(c) which
prohibits all forms of short sales.
The only application of the short-selling provision to options was in the
1961 case of Silverman

y.!.

Landa. (4) Here the court held that a registered

insider who writes a call on shares which he already owns is not in violation
of Section 16(c).

This decision raises the question of whether writing a

naked call would be considered a violation of the prohibition against
short-selling.

Though such facts were not before the court in the Silverman

case, it was suggested by the Sa:: at that time that a violation would be
present under such facts.

Based on the Silverman decision, it would seem

imprudent for an insider to write a call option unless he owns shares
sufficient to cover the option.

The previous exanple can be used to

illustrate Strategy 2.
CAl April 6, 1980 with XYZ stock selling for $50 per share, A writes the
XYZ O::tober 55 put on 500 shares.

the put is currently selling for $8 ($5 of

IV plus $3 of 'lVP) and A thus receives $4,000.

CAl April IS, after the price

of XYZ stock has risen to $55 per share, A writes an XYZ O::tober 50 call
against 500 shares of stock which he already owns.

The call is currently

selling for $8 ($5 of IV plus $3 of 'lVP), hence A receives an additional
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$4,000.

On October 21, the date of expiration, if XYZ stock is selling for

rrore than $55, the put will expire worthless, but the call will be
in-the-rroney and A will be obligated to sell 500 shares of XYZ
per share.

COJllllon

at $50

If XYZ sells for $40 per share or less, then the call will expire

worthless, but the put will be in-the-rroney.

A will thus be obligated to

purchase 500 shares of XYZ at $55 per share (which it will be assumed he then
sells; alternatively, it can be assumed A repurchases the put just prior to
assigrunent).

If on the expiration date, XYZ stock is selling for rrore than

$50 but less than $55 per share then both the put and the call will be
in-the-money.

In this case A will be obligated to purchase 500 shares at $55

and sell 500 shares at $50.

The profitability of this trading strategy is

tabulated in Table 2, and the corresponding profit graph is depicted in Figure

2.
Using Strategy 2, A will realize a profit upon expiration of the options
as long as the underlying stock is priced between $39 and $66 per share.
Furtherrrore, A will receive the maximJrn profit of $5,500 if XYZ happens to be
selling for between $50 and $55 per share.

This strategy can only be

implemented through a margin account and since very little cash will be tied
up, the potential returns are very large.
The third strategy enables the insider to profit from negative inside
information through sillUlating a short sale.

This strategy thus circumvents

the Section 16(c) provision outlawing short sales.

Strategy 3 requires that

the insider write an in-the-rroney call (on shares which he already owns) prior

to public disclosure of negative information regarding his corporation.

When

this information is disseminated, the price of his corporation's stock will
fall resulting in a similar decline in the call premium.

If the insider could

buy back the call at this time he could realize a gain on that position.
avoid violation of l6(b), he instead writes an in-the-money put.

'lb
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Table 2
Profit Table for Insider Trading Strategy 2

PRICES 00 EXPIRATIoo DATE
XYZ
STOCK

XYZ

cx::r

55 Pur

XYZ

cx::r

50 CALL

Pill'

CALL

TOl'AL

PHOFIT

PHOFIT

PHOFIT

35

20

0

-12

8

-4

39

16

0

-8

8

0

40

15

0

-7

8

1

45

10

0

-2

8

6

50

5

0

3

8

11

55

0

5

8

3

11

60

0

10

8

-2

6

65

0

15

8

-7

1

66

0

16

8

-8

0

70

0

20

8

-12

-4
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There are several potential problems with this strategy.

First, if the

underlying shares which the insider already owns have been held for at least
six IID!lths, he would be justified in siJltlly selling those shares when he
obtains the negative information.

this tactic would enable him to avoid the

comnission costs involved in using Strategy 3.

On the other hand, he is now

prohibited by l6(b) from repurchasing those shares during the subsequent six
month period; furthermore, he must forego any dividend payments made during
that period.
An

alternative to sirtply selling the stock when the bad

news

is received,

would be to write a calIon that stock in order to diminish the downside risk.
The insider would be justified in doing this if he has not owned the stock for
at least six months (and is thus prohibited from selling), or if he sinply
does not wish to forego any dividend payments.

Both these two tactics allow

the insider to avoid a loss, however, neither enables him to profit from his
foreknowledge of a price decline.
Strategy 3 is the most profitable trading technique to employ if (1) the
insider is prohibited from selling his stock; (2) the insider does not wish to
forego any dividend payments; and/or (3) the insider feels the price decline
will be relatively shortlived.

For instance, if the insider locks in his

profits on the call and the price of the underlying stock subsequently rises
back to its original level, he will have profited from the option strategy
while losing nothing on the underlying stock.

Consider the following example.

A is on the board of directors of XYZ Corporation.

On January 10, 1981 A

learns that XYZ's fourth quarter earnings figures have dropped far below
analysts predictions.

The decline is due to unexpectedly high start-up costs

for XYZ's newest production facility.

A feels that the problems, though

presently very serious, will be solved within several months.

A owns 500
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shares of XYZ collllOn stock currently selling for $50 per share.

Based on his

knowledge of an inpending decline in the pr ice of XYZ stock A has three
irrmediate choices available: (1) do nothing, (2) sell his 500 shares, and (3)
write an in-the-money calIon his shares.
as too risky.

A rejects the do-nothing strategy

Though A has owned his shares for several years and is thus

under no legal obligation to hold them, he rejects the sell strategy because
he does not wish to forego the 2 1/2 percent quarterly dividend which XYZ pays
on each share of stock.
qn

his shares of stock.

Consequently, A chooses to write an in-the-m::mey call

en January 11, A writes 500 O:::tober 45 calls

currently selling at a premium of $10.

Fbr this he receives $5,000.

(He

sells the O:::tober calls, rather than the July calls, since he knows the
earnings figures won't be released until after January 22 which is less than
six months prior to the July expiration date.) The XYZ earnings figures are
released on January 29, and XYZ stock closes that day at $45 per share.

en

January 30 A writes 500 XYZ O:::tober 50 puts each currently selling for $9.
For this A receives an additional $4,500.

en the expiration date, O:::tober 19,

if XYZ is selling for more than $50 per share, the put will expire worthless,
but the call will be in-the-money and A will be obligated to sell 500 shares
at $45 per share.

If XYZ is selling for $45 per share or less, then the call

will expire worthless but the put will then be in-the-money.

A will thus be

obligated to purchase 500 shares of XYZ stock at $50 per share (which we will
assume he then sells).

Finally, if XYZ stock is selling for more than $45 but

less than $50 per share, then both the put and the call will be in-the-m::mey.
In this event, A will be obligated to purchase 500 shares at $50 and sell 500
shares at $45.

3.

A's profits from this strategy are found in Table 3 and Figure
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Table 3

Profit Table for Insider Trading Strategy 3

PRICES 00 EXPIRATIOO Dl\TE
XYZ
STOCK

XYZ OCT

45 CALL

XYZ OCT
50 PtJr

CALL
ProFIT

Pur
ProFIT

TOl'AL

ProFIT

25

0

25

10

-16

-6

30

0

20

10

-11

-1

31

0

19

10

-10

0

35

0

15

10

-6

4

40

0

10

10

-1

9

45

0

5

10

4

14

50

5

0

5

9

14

55

10

0

0

9

9

60

15

0

-5

9

4

64

19

0

-9

9

0

65

20

0

-10

9

-1

70

25

0

-15

9

-6
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FIGURE 3

Profit C',raoh for Insider Trading Strategy 3
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Using this third strategy, A will realize a profit on the expiration date
as long as XYZ stock is priced between $31 and $64 per share.

Furthermore, A

will receive a maximum profit of $7,000 if XYZ happens to be selling for $45
to $50 per share.
This chapter has presented three trading strategies which, if used in
conjunction with the guidelines for reducing legal risk, appear capable of
skirting existing insider trading regulations.

The question which now arises

is whether registered insiders are actually practicing one or more of these
trading techniques.

Designing a methodology which will provide an answer to

this question is the problem which will now be addressed.
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(1)

Goldberg [15), p. 106.

(2)

For a discussion of options and option strategies, see
Gastineau [14] or McMillian [341 • .

(3)

SEC Docket [47], p. 890.

(4)

Goldberg [151, p. 127.

OJAPTER 6

The profitable use of trading strategies 1, 2, arrl 3 by registered
insiders may involve a violation of Rule lOb-S in addition to the
circumvention of various provisions of Section 16.

Consequently, evidence

that these trading methods are being successfully employed provides sufficient
proof that the existing federal regulations of insider trading are not
accurately stated.

Under some oonditions this evidence may also inply that

the regulations are not adequately enforced.

Designing a methodology which

will provide the greatest probability of locating this evidence

(if

it exists)

given the relevant time and budget constraints is the problem addressed in
this chapter.
Throughout this paper, it has been implicitly assumed that insiders are
risk averse.

This inplies that registered insiders are most likely to use one

of the three trading strategies under conditions where their legal risk is
relatively small.

Recall that legal risk is reduced by (1) trading on less

significant information, (2) trading well in advance of public disclosure, (3)
trading on low volume arrl (4) trading in deep markets.

The first and fourth

factors provide a basis for determining where and relative to what events the
anticipated types of trading behavior are most likely to be observed.

The

second factor is problematic since it enlarges the time period which IlUst be
searched.
The issue of depth is an important one because all three of the proposed
trading strategies involve option transactions.

Markets for put and call

options are characteristically less deep than the corresponding markets for
stock.

FUrthermore, during the period for which data on registered insider
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transactions is available, options trading was less popular

~han

it is today.

Therefore, attention must be focused specifically on insider trading activity
in corporations having relatively deep markets for their put and call options
during this period.
There are

inn~~rable

possible events which could occur to positively or

negatively influence a corporation's future prospects, and the informed
insider could choose to trade on any of these.

FurtherIlOre, he could execute

his initial transaction at any time subsequent to his obtaining the relevant
information and prior to the time when that information is made public.
two methodological problems must be confronted:

Thus,

(1) determining, in a

non-arbitrary fashion, the types of news events which will be examined, and
(2) minimizing the time period which must be scrutinized prior to each news
event.
Examining unexpected earnings announcements provides an adequate solution
to both methodological problems.

First, earnings information, though

potentially very valuable, will never carry the significance of merger or
takeover information.

For an insider trading aboveboard, use of this latter

information will "alI1Ost certainly involve a greater degree of legal risk than
use of the former.

thus it is IIOre likely that one of the three trading

strategies will be observed in relation to earnings announcements than in
relation to IIOre significant news events.
There is a second reason for choosing to focus on unexpected earnings
information.

Because earnings information pertains to a specific period of

time, this information cannot be positively known by anyone prior to the end .
of the period in question.

This is especially true when unexpected earnings

information is considered.

Hence, the insider who bases his trading decisions

on unexpected quarterly earnings information will, in all likelihood, execute

6-3

his initial transaction at some point following the close of the quarter but
before this information is made public.

Since the date on which any past

earnings announcement has been made is a known fact, the time period between
the end of the quarter and the subsequent announcement of that quarter's
earnings can be precisely identified.

In other words, for any past quarterly

earnings figures for any corporation it is possible to determine the exact
time period during which an insider would have had to make his initial
transaction if he were trading on that information.

This fact significantly

reduces the amount of transactions data that RUst be searched to locate the
anticipated behavior.

FUrthermore, since the length of these time periods is

relatively short (generally less than six weeks) and since all three proposed
trading strategies have distinct characteristics, then the occurance of
trading behavior identical to that anticipated can be attributed to the
insider's desire to profit from his knowledge of unreleased earnings
information.
At this point, the specific procedure for selecting the corporations to
examine will be presented.

Since this study will focus on the period from

January 1977 through December 1980, the decision should be based upon the
state of the market during these four years.

~pecifically,

whether or not a

corporation is deemed acceptable for this study should pivot on whether or not
there exists a relatively deep market for options to purchase or sell that
corporation's stock dur log the period under study.

One solution to this

problem would be to choose corporations having the highest average daily
option trading volume during the period under consideration.

However, in

reviewing the nature of the three strategies presented, it is apparent that
this method would not necessarily ,p rovide a list of corporations whose
insiders are most likely to use these strategies.

Note that the trading
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strategies involve writing in-the-money call and/or put options; furthermore,
the deeper these options are in-the-money, the lower the downside risk (since
the profits will be more securely locked in).

Obviously, there is an

advantage to having several in-the-money options from which to choose.
Furthermore, no matter how deep the options market is for a particular stock,
none of the three insider trading strategies can be used if no in-the-money
options are offered.

'!be fact that the converse of this statement is not

necessarily true, suggests that an acceptable procedure for choosing the
corporations to be examined in this study involves selecting those which
typically have the largest number of strike prices offered on their option
contracts during the 1977-80 period.

Specifically, the original list of

corporations was obtained by eliminating all carpanies which did not have at
least three strike prices offered on their call options in three of the four
years from 1977-80.

This original list included 91 corporations.

Next, it is necessary to devise a method for corrpiling a list of
unexpected earnings announcements occuring during the 1977-80 period for each
of the previously selected corporations;

The difficulty lies in defining

'unexpected.' It is iIrportant to keep in mind that the goal of this study is
not

to

compose a list of unexpected earnings reports; rather, this list will

only serve as a menas for eliminating periods of time during which the trading
strategies are less likely to be used.

Thus devoting a considerable amount of

time toward this one methodological point is unnecessary.
When a corporation's earnings figures are released, the information
content of those figures will be incorporated in the price of that firm's
stock.

If the earnings figures are in line with analysts' predictions, then

there will be very little information contained in the announcement which is
not already reflected in the security's price.

However, if the

earning~
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figures exceed or fail to meet analysts' estimated, then the price of the
stock will rise or fall until the information contained in those figures has
been fully incorporated in the price.
For the purpose of this study, a firm's quarterly earnings announcement
will be defined as unexpected if there is a concurrent change in the price of
a share of that corporation's stock of at least five percent.
earnings figures are announced, it is often impossible
day on which the figures are released.

to

Due to the way

determine the exact

For instance, if an earnings report is

printed in Wednesday's Wall Street Journal, it cannot be determined whether
the armouncement was made before or after Tuesday's market closed.
reason it is necessary that

two

day's trading activity be examined in

connection with each earnings announcement:
the day of publication.

For this

the day prior to publication and

Specifically, a company's earnings figures will be

consider!'!d unexpected if (1) there is a price change of at least five percent
on the day preceding publication; (2) there is a price change of at least five
percent on the day of publication; or (3) the net price change over the two
day period is at least five percent.
Fbr each of the 91 corporations on the previous list, all earnings
announcements during the four-year period were examined.

All corporations for

which no unexpected earnings announcements were found were eliminated from the
list.

After this step was Cdlrpleted, 56 corporations remained with a total of

144 unexpected earnings announcements.

Since the size of this list greatly

exceeded the size which could be adequatley studied, the decision was made to
eliminate corporations until a minimum of twenty corporations and fifty
unexpected earnings announcements remained.

It -was desirable to choose a

method of elimination which would retain those announceIrents which offered the
greatest potential for using one of the three strategies.

This was
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accomplished by computing the total number of call option strike prices
offered by each corporation over the four year period.

Firms offering the

fewest number of strike prices were eliminated ·until further eliminations
WO!Jld result in violation of the desired minil1lllllS.

The final list contains 23

corporations and 61 unexpected earnings announcements.
For each unexpected earnings announcement on this final list, it is
necessary to determine a set of time per iods in which trades would have
occurred if one of the proposed strategies were being utilized by the insider.
Furthermore, it is possible to determine the types of trades which arE
expected to occur in each of the time periods.

It is now necessary t .J

describe in detail what these time periods and the corresponding expected
trades will look like for each trading strategy.
Trading Strategy 1 involves the purchase of common stock before the
earnings announcement, the writing of an in-the-money call following the
announcement, and the subsequent disposition of stock through exercise of the
call on the expiration date (which is at least six months after the call was
written) •

It has been inplicitly assumed that the call is in-the""1lX)ney upon

expiration; this need not be the case.

If the call expires out-of-the-money,

then the insider mayor may not choose to sell the underlying stock once the
expiraton date has passed.

At first blush this observation seems to introduce

some complications into the methodology.

For instance, if a sale of the stock

is not observed on or shortly after the expiration date of the call, is it
possible that trading strategy 1 was not in fact being used? The answer to
this question is no.
stock be observed:

In fact, it is not necessary that dispostion of the
if the call expires in-the-money, then the stock will

undoubtedly be sold due to exercise; it is not necessary to observe this
know it has hawened.

to

On the other hand, if the call expires worthless, then
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the insider's decision regarding whether or not to sell the stock will depend
upon (among other things) his expectations of the firm's prospects at that
time.

If the insider chooses not to sell the stock, this does not imply that

he has not used or not benefitted fran trading strategy 1The significance of all this from a methodological perspective is that in
order to identify a particular insiders' trading behavior as strategy 1, it is
not necessary to observe the disposition of the tl«> posi tions( i. e. , exercise
of call or I«>rthless expiration of call and sale of stock).
Now, if it is unnecessary to observe any transaction on or after the

expiration date of the call in order to conclude that strategy 1 has been
used, then what of the period between the writing of the call and that call's
expiration date?

It can be argued that it is also unnecessary to observe any

of the insider's transactions during this period.
out that

~,e

It has already been pointed

call's expiration date is at least six months after the date on

which it is written.

(If this is not the case, then the insider will have

violated Section 16(b) upon expiration of the call.) DJring the six month
period immediately following the call transaction, the insider must not
purchase a call or sell stock in his corporation.

If he does then he will

have violated Section 16 (b) and will have any profits disgorged.

Furthermore,

any other (legal) transactions which the insider makes in his corporation's
securities during t hese six months (e.g., pruchasing more stock, writing
additional calls, etc.) can be considered independent of his strategy 1
position and thus uniJltlortant.
It is now necessary to examine the period of time after the first six
months have passed but prior to the call's expiration date.

DJring this

period the insider is free to make any trades he wishes without violating the
short swing rule.

If he decides to sell his stock and buy back the call prior
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to expiration, then he will still realize a profit from strategy 1 (though

this will involve commission costs on two transactions rather than one).
Insofar as the methodology is concerned, this all boils down to the fact that
any transactions the insider makes subsequent to writing the call can be
considered independent of his strategy 1 position and hence they need not be
observed.

In other words, it is only necessary to observe two things in order

to determine that an attenpt is being made on the part of the insider to

circumvent the short swing rule through strategy 1:
1. The insider IlUst have purchased shares of stock prior to the quarterly
earnings announcement but subsequent to the close of the quarter in
question.

2. The insider IlUst have written an in-the-money call within five
trading days following the earnings announcement. The expiration date of
this call IlUst be at least six months subsequent to the date of purchase.
Notice

that in searching for the date on which the call was written

(requirement 2), only the five trading days immediately following the earnings
announcement are scrutinized.

Though the information contained in the

earnings figures should be incorporated in the stock's price on the date of
announcement (assuming the semi-strong form of the efficient market hypothesis
holds), the insider might not write the call for several days subsequent to
the anrxJUncement.
Similar arguments to those made regarding the necessary observations
required to identify an insider's use of trading strategy 1 can be applied to
trading strategy 2.

Thus the type of trading behavior which is expected if an

insider is using strategy 2 can be summarized as follows:
1. The insider IlUst have written an in-the""'lOOl'ley put prior to the
quarterly earnings announcement but subsequent to the close of the quarter
in question. The expiration date of this put IlUst be at least six rnonths
subsequent to the date of purchase. (It is expected that this option will
have the same expiration date as the option written follC1tling the earnings
announcement. )
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2. The insider IlUst have written an in-the"1lDney call within five trading
days following the earnings announcement. The expiration date of this
call IlUst be at least six months subsequent to the date of purchase.
Finally, the observed behavior for trading strategy 3 is presented below:
1. The insider IlUst have 'written an in-the-money call prior to the
quarterly earnings announcement but subsequent to the close of the quarter
in question. The expiration date of this call IlUst be at least six months
subsequent to the date of purchase. (It is expected that this option will
have the same expiration date as the option written following the earnings
announcement. )
2. The insider IlUst have written an in-the~y put within five trading
days following the earnings announcement. The expiration date of this put
IlUst be at least six months subsequent to the date of purchase.
Insiders are required to disclose their trades on the SEC's Form 4,
entitled "Statement of Changes in Beneficial Ownership of Securities." The
insider must file this form within ten days after the month in which any
change in beneficial ownership of securities has occurred.
provide the source for all data used in this study.

These forms

Any stock purchased or

sold by the insider will be recorded in Table I, while any options
transactions will be reported in Table II.
Appendix 1 contains 3 photocopied Form 4' s
two

(two

pages each).

The first

pages represent how trading strategy 1 might appear on a Form 4 filing

with the SEC.

Note that the information recorded on this form corresporrls to

the example presented earlier involving insider A of the XYZ Corporation.

The

secorrl Form 4 represents A's use of strategy 2, and the third Form 4
illustrates A's use of strategy 3.

Though in each case both trades appear on

the same filing, this need not occur in actual practice.
To determine whether Section 16 (b) is being circumvented along with

violations of RIle lOb-5, Form 4' s will be examined during the period from
1977 through 1980.

The specific Fbrms examined will be those which corresporrl

to periods of time surrounding unexpected earnings announcements.
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In particular, relative to each unexpected earnings announcement, there
ex i sts a corresponding tiIre period during which one might expect to observe
the use, by insiders, of one or rore of the three strategies.

(The list of

unexpected earnings announcements is given in Appendix 4, while Appendix 5
contains a list of the Form 4' s corresponding to these announcements.) The
statistic which will be collected is the fraction of all insiders trading
during all relevant tiIre periods who made use of one of the three strategies.
Conclusions and policy i.l!plications will be drawn based upon the magnitude of
this statistic.

CHAPl'ER 7

Examining the Fbrm 4 Statements as detailed in the previous chapter
yielded no evidence of insiders' use of the proposed trading strategies.
Furthel1OOre, there were no instances of insiders writing options (either puts
or calis) during the relevant time periods.

There are four possible

explanations for this absence of significant findings.
The most obvious explanation is that the proposed trading strategies are
not as profitable as pure stock transactions.
insider who follows strategy 1

~ld,

That is to suggest that an

in the long run, be worse off than an

insider who simply purchased stock, held it for s ix months, and then sold.
The latter strategy will henceforth be referred to as a 'buy-and-hold'
strategy.

The plausibility of this explanation will now be tested.

Fbr each of the 44 positive unexpected earnings announcements listed in
Appendix 4, a collparison can be made between the returns from using strategy 1
and the returns from using a buy-and-hold strategy.

'lb allow for

c:arparability, several simplifying assUllptions are needed.

Strategy 1 Assumptions
(1) On the first trading day folowing the end of the quarter, an insider
purchases 500 shares of stock at that day's closing price.
(2) Fbllowing the five percent price rise associated with the earnings
announcement, the insider writes call options on 500 shares of stock. He
chooses the call which is nearest to but not less than ten points
in-the;roney. If no calls are offered which are at least ten points
in-the-money, then he writes the call which is most deeply in-the-noney.
The expiration date chosen is the one which is nearest to but not less
than six months in the future.
(3) The insider holds both positions until the call's expiration date, at
which time the stock is sold. If, upon expiration, the call is
in-the;roney, then the stock is sold at the strike price, otherwise the
stoCk is sold at its closing price on the expiration date.
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Buy-and-Hold Assumptions

(1) This insider purchases 500 shares of stock on the same day and at the
same price as the insider using strategy 1.
(2) This insider sells his 500 shares on the same day as the strategy 1
insider; however, his selling price is always the closing price.
The internal rate of return on the buy-and-hold strategy can be conp.lted
by manipulating the present value forllUla:

so + CSO =

(S2 - CS2)/(1 + r~f·

.

Here, the present value of the buy-and-hold strategy, SO + CSO, Equals the
future cash flow, S2 - CS2, discounted at the rate of return r8l\.

Solving for

r .. yields,

~'i
y(S2 - CS2)/(SO + CSO)

- 1

,

where:
r~

= the internal rate of return ~ed daily

on the buy-and-hold strategy.
t.

= the number of days form the purchase date to

sale date.

50 = the purchasing price of 500 shares of stock.

CSO = conunission charges on SO. (The conunission
schedule is listed in Appendix 6.)
52 = the sale price of 500 shares of stock.

CS2 = conmission charges on S2.
'lb conpute the internal rate of return for strategy 1, the following forllUla

would have to be solved for r51.

50

+

CSO

'"

Wl-oo.
(1 + r,,)"'

+

-

--

52 - CS2
(1 + r,,)"'
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(*)

where:
r., : the internal rate of return on strategy 1.
tl

'" the number of days from the purchase date
to the date on which the calls are written.

52 '"

sale price of 500 shares of stock,
= 52 if calls are out-of-the-money upon
expiration.
'" the strike price of the calls if they
are in-the-money upon expiration.

CS2 '"

commission charges on

52.

WI '" amount received for writing calls on
shares of stock.
00. '"

500

commission charges on WI.

Unfortunately, this equation cannot be solved explicitly for r sl '

There is,

however, an alternative to direct comparison of the returns associated with
the

two

strategies.

If r O" is substituted for r" in equation (*), then it is

possible to solve the right side for the present value of strategy 1
discounted at the internal rate of return on the buy-and-hold strategy.
figure can then be COIIpared to the left side of the equation, SO +
represents the present value of the buy-and-hold strategy.

CSO,

This
which

This approach is

illustrated by the following relationship:
50

+ CSO

Wl - 00.
(1 + r ",)t,

+

~

-

52 - CS2
(1 + r ",)t.

If the right side of the above equation exceeds the left side, then this
implies that for a given unexpected earnings announcement, the insider would
have been better off using strategy 1 than using the buy-and-hold strategy.
These calculations were performed for 38 of the positive unexpected
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earnings announcements. (1) The results indicated that in 25 of the cases
(apprOKimately 66 percent), the return on strategy 1 would have exceeded the
return on a buy-and-hold strategy.

Although it appears that the buy-and-hold

strategy is inferior to strategy 1, rothing has yet been said regarding the
profitability of the buy-and-hold strategy relative

to

strategies 2 or 3.

Strategies 2 and 3 are essentially the same, thus, what applies to
strategy 2 IlUst also apply

to

strategy 3.

and subsequently writing a call.

Strategy 2 involves writing a put

Both these transactions result in the writer

receiving cash, thus making it difficult to COIlpUte a meaningful return.
Nevertheless, it is fairly obvious that if strategy 2 were used in place of
strategy 1, it would yield a higher return.

This is because it yields cash

flows which are similar in magnitude to those received for strategy 1, yet
reguires a much smaller cash cammittment.

Consequently, strategy 2 (as well

as strategy 3) can be considered superior to a

buy-and~hold

strategy.

Based

on these results, the explanation that strategies 1, 2, and 3 are not as
profitable as a buy-and-hold strategy seems implausible.
A secon:'I explanation for

why

the strategies were not observed is that

perhaps insiders perceive the value of the punishment for using strategies 1,
2, or 3 IlUltiplied by the legal risk as exceeding the expected utility from
using a particular strategy.

This implies one of two possibilities.

First,

it may be that these strategies were not observed in the periods examined
because their 'u se would have involved a lOb-5 violation, and that the legal
risk associated with this violation exceeded that
willing

to

bear.

~ich

This is unlikely for two reasons.

the insiders were

First, previous studies

(see Chapter 4) have produced results which strongly suggest that the legal
risk associated with lOb-5 violations is rot sufficient
from trading based on inside information.

Second,

to

deter many insiders

as pointed out in Chapter
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5, the SEC has developed a set of priorities which give relatively little
weight to enforcing Rule lOb-5 as it pertains to events such as earnings
announcements.
for these

two

Peruran' s (381 findings also support this conclusion.

Hence,

reasons, it aH;>ears unlikely that the legal risk associated with

a lOb-5 violation is, by itself, sufficient to deter all insiders from using
strategies 1, 2, or J.
'lbe second possibility suggested by this _explanation is that when the

perceived legal risk associated with writing the options is combined with the
legal risk associated with the lOb-5 violation (occuring after the initial
transaction), the resulting probability of detection exceeds that which the
insiders are willing to bear.

In other words, insiders perceive there to be

some legal risk associated with writing an option after an earnings
announcement is made.

Certainly there is no lOb-5 violation, since this

transaction occurs after the earnings information is made public.
FurtherllOre, there is no 16 (b) violation as was pointed out in Chapter 5.
However, despite the fact that the legal risk associated with a 16(b)
violation is zero when these strategies are used, insiders may perceive this
risk to be nonzero.

Thus, one plausible explanation is that insiders do not

realize that strategies 1, 2, and 3 do not involve violations of Section
16(b).
A third explanation for

why

use of the trading strategies was not observed

is that they are either too involved or

too

difficult to understand.

A test

to determined whether this explanation is reasonable would be to examine the
transactions of insiders in the securities of other corporations.

If the test

produced no evidence of insiders using strategies 1, 2, or 3 when they traded
the securities of other firms, then this explanation could not be rejected.
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A fourth explanation is that insiders who are knowledgable enough about
insider trading regulations and stock options to come up with strategies 1, 2,
or 3, are probably knowledgable enough to circumvent the entire disclosure
process.

'!bat is, a shre<Nd insider could easily trade through a third party

the day before an announcement, and trade again the day after, failing to
disclose either transaction to the SF.X::.

'!be only clue left behind by this

strategy is an increase in trading volume, and this trace can easily be
covered by making small trades at discrete intervals.

Even when the SEC

notices an increase in trading, major problems remain.

According to Dooley

[9], once this hawens,
the oommission must be prepared to scrutinize carefully trading records to
learn the identities of purchasers, to devise criteria to winnow the
suspicious trades, to search that list to see whether any patterns or
other indications of relationships emerge that demonstrate possible access
to inside information, and to interview the purchasers and others to
determine whether such access in fact existed and whether the restricted
information probably was conveyed and acted upon. The Comnission rust go
through this tedious process before it can decide whether an enforcement
action would be worthwhile. (2)
'!bis chapter has presented three plausible explanations for why insider
usage of trading strategies 1, 2, or 3 was not observed.

'!be first is that

insiders wrongly perceive these strategies to involve violations of Section
16(b}.

This perceived legal risk, when added to the legal risk asso:::iated

with a lOb-5 violation exceeds the level of legal risk insiders are willing to
bear in order to obtain the profits connected with the use of these
strategies.

'!be second explanatiCXI is that use of these trading strategies is

too conplex to understand or too time consLmling to warrent their use.
Finally, it was proposed that perhaps insiders who are perceptive enough to
consider using these strategies would opt for a strategy of nondisclosure.
'!bat is, they would find it IIOre profitable and less tedious to sinply · trade
through a third party or Swiss bank account and reap even greater returns.
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FCXJmOl'ES TO CHAPTER 7

(1)

Six of the 44 positive announcements were excluded. 'lliree
announcements required price data from February, 1980.
'lliis data was unavailable. 'lliree other announcements
exhibited a fall in price between the stock purchase date
and the date on which the call was to be written. Returns
were not computed for these since it was assumed that
insiders would have no desire to lock in a loss using one
of the trading strategies.

(2)

Dooley 9, p. 19-20.

CHAPl'ER 8

This study has sought to determine the effectiveness of current federal
insider trading regulations--specifically, Section 16 of the 1934 SEA and Rule
10b-S promulgated in 1942.

It was assumed that the effectiveness of such

proscriptions is conditional upon the extent to which they are enforced and
the manner in which they are stated.
Due to the ambitious nature of Rule 10b-S, the SEC's enforcement efforts
have been hampered by two fundamental weaknesses.

First, the detection of

10b-S violations has become an increasingly frustrating task despite the aid
of sophisticated computer systems employed by the SEC and the self-regulated
security exchanges.

It is apparent that various tactics exploited by persons

possessing inside information have enabled a large proportion of violations
go undetected.

to

Second, even when possible 10b-5 violations are uncovered,

additional obstacles have been encountered when attempting to obtain
convictions. Although criminal convictions carry stiff penalties, successful
prosecutions have been extremely rare.

As a consequence, the relatively

unexacting civil penalties have become the effective sanction for violating
Rule 10b-5.

The existence of these problems has forced the SEC to make

compromises regarding the types of violations it pursues most vigorously.
Specifically, it now appears that the SEC's enforcement efforts are directed
almost exclusively toward detecting

egr~ious
,

violations which can be settled

at relatively low cost through civil injunctions.

Consequently, registered

insiders wishing to control their level of legal risk can do so by altering
the type of information upon which their trades are based and by adjusting the
volume and timing of their transactions.
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In addition to the difficulties associated with the enforcement of Rule
13b-5, major shortcomings are also apparent in the construction of Section 16.
Specifically, this section does not explicitly prohibit the use of various
trading strategies which would be considered harmful by proponents of the
traditional viewpoint.

This study presented three such trading strategies

which employ the use of exchange traded stock options to lock in an 'on paper'
profit thereby enabling registered insiders to legally circumvent Section
16(b).

When used in conjunction with the guidelines for controlling legal

risk, these tactics represent a powerful device for skirting federal insider
trading laws.
A methodology was developed to determine whether these strategies were
being employed by registered insiders in order to defer short swing profits
accruing as a result of firm specific events.

In this study the events chosen

were unexpected earnings announcements.
An

examination of the trading activity of registered insiders surrounding

the dates of unexpected earnings announcements during the period from January,
1977 through December,

198~

strategies were being used.

yielded no evidence that the proposed trading
The most plausible explanation for this result is

that the opportunity cost of utilizing these strategies is too great to
justify their use.

This excessive cost may be due to their relatively high

degree of complexity and/or to the existence of alternative strategies capable
of providing greater returns without exorbitant levels of financial or legal
risk (e.g., trading through third parties or SWiss bank accounts).
The findings of this study are twofold.

First, despite the fact that the

use of the proposed trading strategies was not observed, they remain a
practicable means for legally circumventing Section 16(b).

Hence, it can be

concluded that due to their failure to fully recognize the existence of a
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commercial market for stock options, current regulations of insider trading
are not accuratley constructed.

Second, although existing evidence strongly

suggests that the SEC's enforcement policies allow a significant proportion of
13b-5 violations by registered insiders to go undetected, the findings of this
study do not support this conclusion.
Based upon these results it becomes necessary to determine whether the
existing regulations should be modified to explicitly prohibit the use of
trading strategies such as those presented in this paper.

One possible

modification would be to simply invoke a flat prohibition on all trading in
commercial stock options by registered insiders.
would be to

&~end

Another less extreme measure

Section 16(b) making it illegal for registered insiders to

execute more than one option transaction (regardless of the type of option and
the type of transaction) during a six month period.
The principal costs of modifying the federal insider trading regulations
would be incurred as a result of the additional enforcement measures taken to
insure compliance with the new provisions.

From a traditional standpoint, the

benefits associated with such modifications would be those accruing as a
result of eliminating the risk of wealth losses to insiders as a consequence
of their use of the proposed trading strategies.

However, the fact that this

study uncovered no evidence that the strategies are being used by registered
insiders suggests that the losses incurred by outsiders due to these tactics
is negligible.

If this is true, then it is likely that modifying the existing

regulations would involve marginal enforcement costs which exceed the marginal
loss from allowing the existing loopholes to remain.

A further argument

against modifying the existing regulations can be based upon the explanation
that use of the proposed trading strategies was not observed because of the
existence of more lucrative trading schemes.

If this is indeed the case, then
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resources should not be devoted to modifying the existing regulations until
the SEC is able to capably enforce the regulations as they now stand •

..
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APPENDIX 2

The Cady, Roberts Decision*
In early November, 1959, Robert M. Gintel, a securities broker of Cady,
Hoberts and Go., was notified by Curtiss-Wright Gorp. that a public
presentation of their .new engine would take place on November 23.

Since only

2,000 such invitations were sent out prior to the presentation date, the
information they contained was not considered public until that date.
D.lr ing the per ied from libvenber 6 to the day of the presentation, Mr. Gintel
pruchased 11,000 shares of Curtiss-Wright stock for his clients.

On

November

24, the day follolNing the presentation, the stock rose from 32 to 35 1/4.

By

11:00 a.m. on the 25th, Mr. Gintel had sold 6,500 Curtiss-Wright shares.
Also on the morning of the 25th, directors of Curtiss-Wright met and
approved a reduced Dividend for the following quarter.

A representative of

Cady, R::berts and Go. who had attended the board meeting, notified Mr. Gintel
of the news shortly after 11 :00 a.m.

By 11 :18 Mr. Gintel had sold an

additional 7,000 shares (including short sales) of Curtiss-Wright stock.
Because of an unexplained delay, news of the dividend cut did not reach the
NYSE

until nearly 12:30 p.m.

Curtiss-wright closed trading that day down 4

1/2 points.
Mr. Gintel and Cady, Roberts and Go. were found guilty of violations of

Section lOeb), Section 17(a), and Rule 10b-5.
received a twenty day suspension from the

New

Gintel was fined $3,000 and
York Stock Exchange.

The Cady, lbberts Decision was iIrportant for two reasons.

First, it

extended liability to persons other than corporate officers, directors, and
large shareholders.

Second, it clarified the antifraud provisions of the

Securities Exchange Act.

*Jaffe [20], pp. 117-118.
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APPENDIX 3
The Texas Gulf Sulfur Case*
In 1959 the Texas G.1lf Sulfur Co. began conducting exploratory activities
in Canada's Ontario Province.

Coresanples collected on N:>veni:ler 12, 1963

indicated evidence of unusually large mineral deposits in the area of Timmins,
Ontario.
share.

At this time, TGS stock was selling on the NYSE at about

~18

per

TGS wanted the informatioo kept secret to allow them time to acquire

rights to surrounding lands and conduct further exploration.

This objective

was acconplished by enploying numerous ruses including the issuance of a
misleading press release on April 12, 1964.
D.lring the period from Noveni:ler 1963 to March 1964, TGS insiders executed
purchases of 9,100 shares of stock.

furthermore, they leaked this information

concerning huge mineral depostis to others (referred to as tippees).

'Ihese

tippees purchased an additional 12,100 shares of stock and acquired optioos to
buy another 14,100 shares.

By the end of April, TGS stock had risen to

30 and

subsequently continued to rise to a high of 71 within a year.

On April 19, 1965, the SEC filed suit against TGS and several high ranking
enployees.

'Ihe enployees were alleged to have based their purchasing

decisions on the secret information concerning the large mineral finds.

'Ihe

action sought to conpel defendants to offer restitution to those individuals
who sold stock or calls to corporate insiders or tippees.

On August 19, 1966 a decision was handed down declaring that all trading
prior to April 9, 1964 was not unlawful because the informatioo concerning the
discovery was not considered to be material at the time.

'frades occurring

after April 9, however, were declared to be in violatioo of

*Goldberg [15l, pp.83-100; Jaffe [20], pp.118-119.

~le

10b-5.
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APPENDIX 4
Dates of Unexpected Earnings Announcements
Corporation Name
Positive (+l!Negative (-)
1.

Announcement Rate

Amerada Hess Corp.

+

APR

24, 1978

o:T 30,

2.

o.

MAY 31, 1979

APR
I!KN

28, 1978
1, 1978

MAR 31, 1978

APR 19, 1977

MAR 31, 1977

SEP

29, 1978

JAN 22, 19ao
22, 1980
o:T 21, 1980
JUL

31, 1979
30, 1980
SEE' 30, 1980
00;

JON

APR 13,

1978

MAR 31, 1978

o:T 17,

1~7a

o:T

tl, 1978

Digital Equipment Corp.

28, 1978
8, B79

MAR 31, 1978

19, 1977
JAN 16, 1979
APR 22, 1980
o:T 21, 1980

30, 1977
29, 197tl
MAR 29, 1980
SEP 30, 1980

JON 3, 1980
SEE' 3, 1980
DEX; 9, 1980

APR 30, 1980
JUL 31, 1980
o:T 31, 1980

APR
AUG

JON 29, 1979

Do Pont Co.

+
+
+
8.

23, 1979

Corning Glass Works

+
+
7.

31, 1978

JUL

Control Data Corp.
+

5.

FEB 28, 1978
AUG

Burlington Northern Inc.
+
+
+
+

4.

1~78

Bally Mfg. Corp.
+
+

3.

Quarter Ending

JUL

JOl'I
00;

.F luor Corp.

+
+

A-ll

9.

Ford l'btor Co.

+
10.

+

+

+

+

APR 30, 1979
JUL 31, 1979
JAN 31, 1980

JUL 16, 1980
ocr 10, 1980

JUN

APR. 20,
20,
ocr 17,
APR 17,

MAR
JUN
SEP
MAR

30, 1980
SEP 30, 1980

JUL

1977
1978
1978
1980

31,
30,
29,
29,

l':J77
1978
1978
1980

JUL

JUL 15, 1977
14, 19130

JUN 30, 1977
JUN 30, 1980

JUN 2, 1978
MAY 23, 1979

APR 28, 1978
APR 30, 1979

APR.
JAN
APR
JUL

25,
28,
22,
28,

1978
1980
1980
1980

MAR 31, 1~78
!lEX: 31, 1979
MAR 29, 1980
JUN 30, 1980

ocr

26, 1978

SEP 29, 1978

McDonnell Ib..Jglas Corp.

+
+

18.

MAY 21, 1979
AUG 20, 1979
FEB 22, 1980

DOC 31, 1979

Litton Industries Inc.

+
17.

SJ::P 30, 1980

IBM CafE.

+
16.

8, 1980
3, 1980

FEB
t-oJ

HoneyWell Inc.

+
+

15.

JUN 29, 1979
29, 1980
SEP 30, 1980

Hilton Hotels Corp.

+
14.

MIlli

1~80

Hewlett-Packard Co.

+

13.

AUG 2, 1979
MAY 2, 1980
NOV 12, 1980

30,

Halliburton Co.

+
+
12.

JlM

General Dynamics Corp.

+

11.

30, 1980

JUL

Mesa Petroleum Co.
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19.

National Semiconductor Corp.
+
+

20.

ocr 31, 1970
APR 30, 1980

AUG 14, 1978
AUG 14, 1979
AUG 14, 1980

JON 30, 1978
JON 29, 1979
JON 30, 1900

OCT 13,

1977
JAN 17, 1978
JUL 14, 1';;78
JAN 12, 1979
JM ~, 1980
APR 9, 1900

SEP 30,
DEX:: 30,
JUN 30,
DEX:: 29,
DEC 31,
MAR 29,

FEB 3, 1978
JAN 31, 1980
.lUI. 28, 1';;80

DOC 30, 1':;177
31, 1':;179
JUN 30, 19t1O

Teledyne Inc.
+
+
+
+
+
+

23.

t¥N 30, 1978
MAY 29, 1980

MAR

Tandy Corp.
+
+
+

22.

5, 1978
3, 1980
MAY 31, 1980
i\'lAH,

Syntex Corp.
+

21.

MAR 20, 1~78
MAR 17, 1900
JUN 25, 1980

1977
1977
1978
1978
1979
19!jO

Texas Instruments Inc.

+

D&:
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APPENDIX 5

Form 4 I S Examined
1.

2.

Amerada Hess Corp.
1978: MAR, APR, MAY, SEP, OCl',
1979: JUN, JUL

N(N

Bally Mfg. Corp.
1978:

APR, MAY, Q(..'l', IiKN

3.

Burlington Northern Inc.
1977: APR
1980 : JAN , JUL, CCl'

4.

Control Data Corp.
1978: APR

5.

Coming Glass Works
1978: APR

6.

Digital Equipment Corp.
1978: APR, MAY
1979 : JUL, AUG

7.

du Pont Co.
1977: JUL
1979: JAN
1980: APR, CCl'

8.

Fluor Corp.
1980: MAY, JUN, AUG, SEP , 1iKN, DEC

9.

Ford M:>tor Corp.
1980: JUL, AUG

10.

General Dynamics Corp.
1979: JUL, AUG
1980: APR, MAY, CCl',

N(N

11.

Halliburton Co.
1980: JAN, FEB, CCl', IiKN

12.

Hewlett-Packard Co.
1979: MAY, AUG
1980: FEB

13.

Hilton Hotels Corp.
1980: JUL, CCl'

A-14
14.

15.

Honeywell
1977:
197tl:
1980:

Inc.
APR
JUl.,

ocr

APR

IBM Corp.

1977:
1980:

JUL
JUL

16.

Litton Industries Inc.
1978: MAY, JUN
1979: MAY

17.

~Donnell

1978:
1980:
18.

Douglas Corp.
APR, MAY
JAN, FEB, APR, JUl., AUG

Mesa Petroleum Co.

1978:

ocr,

t¥:JJ

19.

National Semicorxluctor Corp.
1978: MAR
1980: MAR, JUN, JUL

20.

Syntex Corp.
1978: t¥:JJ , DEC
1980: MAY, JUN

2l.

Tandy Corp.
1978: JUl., AUG
1979: JUL, AUG
1980: JUL, AUG

22.

Teledyne Inc.
1977: ocr
1978: JAI.'II , JUi.
1979: JAI.'II
1980: JAN, APR

23.

Texas Instruments Inc.
1978: JAN, FEB
1980: JAN, FEB, JUL, AUG

A-IS

APPEI.'IDIX 6

Stock and 9ption CCmlnission Schedule
STOCK
Amount of Purchase

Comuission on Purchase

Under :;i5,000

$28 + .008 (:;iilmount)

$5,000 - $15,000

$28 + .006 ($iImount)

Oller $15,000

$28 + .004 ($Amount)

iImount of Purchase

Comnission on Purchase

Under :;i3,000

:;i28 + .013 ($iImount)

$3,000 - $10,000

$28 + .010 ($iImount)

Oller $10,000

$28 + .007 ($iImount)
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